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Introduction
Within the last seventeen years, over 10,600 Palestinians and Israelis have been killed
because of the seemingly never-ending conflict (B’Tselem, 2017 and UNHRC, 2015). Of those
10,600 Palestinians and Israelis killed in the last seventeen years, approximately 2,300 died in
the most recent 2014 Israel-Gaza War (World Report 2014, 2015). As the deadliest military
offensive to occur since the onset of the conflict in 1948, the international community has largely
condemned the actions taken by Palestinian and Israeli actors during the 2014 conflict as having
deliberately targeted protected civilians and civilian areas (Amnesty International, 2014).
Despite this widespread condemnation, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is
currently the only international institution to have initiated a criminal investigation1 regarding
‘alleged crimes’ committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, since the initial start of the
conflict on June 13, 2014 (ICC, 2017). While the ICC is presently only in the second phase of its
preliminary examination, the court has identified a variety of ‘alleged violations’ committed by
the IDF, Hamas and various other Palestinian armed groups. Although the ICC has yet to
determine whether these alleged acts amount to ‘crimes of atrocity’ 2and therefore fall within the
court’s subject-jurisdiction, the international community has generally referred to these acts as
amounting to ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ (Amnesty International, 2014 and
UNHRC, 2015). While it is commendable that a significant portion of the international
community has publically recognized the seriousness of the acts committed during the 2014

1

While very few international institutions have the authority or jurisdiction to conduct a criminal prosecutions,
organizations like the UN that do have criminal jurisdiction over the matter and have expressed their concern for
the matter, have refrained from conducting any officials investigations
2
According to the United Nations (2014), atrocity crimes refers to genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
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conflict, the international community has entirely ignored the most serious crime of all:
genocide.
As the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine is inherently rooted in their
religious-national differences as Israeli-Jews and Arab-Palestinians, it is necessary to examine
the conflict from a genocidal perspective. Discounting the possibility that the crimes committed
during the 2014 conflict may amount to acts of genocide, fundamentally ignores and denies the
shared experiences suffered by Palestinian and Israeli individuals as a part of their respective
religious-nationalist group. As such, the primary purpose of this study is to determine whether
the actions taken by Israeli and Palestinian actors throughout the 2014 Israel-Gaza War
constitute as acts of genocide under international law. This analysis is necessary to not only
recognize the shared experiences felt by Israeli-Jews and Arab-Palestinians, but also with the aim
of more fully understand the conflict and one day find a durable peace for the future.
In order to understand the present conflict as a possible genocide, a review of the
literature is essential to develop an understanding of the concept of genocide and determine how
scholars have applied this concept to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A methods section will
follow, in which key terms are conceptualized and the research design is established. A brief
history of the conflict will come next in order to develop a necessary understanding of the
conflict as a whole. A single case study will then follow, separately examining the actions of
Palestinian and Israeli actors in order to determine whether they constitute as genocide under
international law. The study will then conclude with a short discussion regarding the findings
and what this means for any possible future investigation.
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Literature Review
1. Lemkin and the Legal Codification of Genocide
The term genocide was first used by Raphael Lemkin (1944) in his book the Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe, to signify “the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group,” (Lemkin, 1944:
79). He understood genocide as acts directed against an individual or group of individuals, solely
based on their membership in a larger group, in order to cause the destruction of that group as a
whole. According to his conception of genocide, genocidal acts do not have to result in the
immediate destruction of a nation or group, but may also constitute as a coordinated plan
intended to destroy the “essential foundations of the life of the national group, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves,” (Lemkin, 1944: 79). His conception of genocidal was not
limited to physical killing, rather it included acts that deprived and severely endangered human
life. He identifies two phases within genocide. The first being the destruction of the oppressed
groups’ national pattern or group identity and the second the imposition of the oppressor’s
nationality upon the oppressed. Lemkin specifically recognized the imposition of the oppressor’s
nationality on the oppressed as an act of genocide, in itself, because it caused the social death of
that group. According to his conceptualization, the crime of genocide is more than just the
physical death and destruction of a group but also includes the death and destruction of that
group’s culture. He specifically understood the destruction of a culture as a “special kind of
crime because culture is the unit of collective memory” which results in the loss of those
individual member’s identities and memories (Lemkin, 2009, 12).
Following the publication of his work, Lemkin (1944) actively called upon the United
Nations (UN) to codify his definition of genocide under international law. Despite his active
involvement in the process, the recognized legal definition of genocide is significantly different
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from the one Lemkin intended. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNGC) (1948) legally criminalized genocide as a punishable act under
international law in 1951, upon receiving the necessary signatures from member’s states. Since
its official enactment into law, the international community understands the crime of genocide as
a norm of jus cogens and therefore a criminal act regardless of whether a state has signed or
recognized the Genocide Convention (Bassiouni, 1996).
According to this convention, the crime of genocide is defined as a specific set of acts
which are “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious” (UNGC, 1948, 1). The convention explicitly recognized five acts of genocide, which
the convention defines as:
a) killing members of the group;
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c)) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(UN CPPCG, 1948: 1)
In addition to the crime of genocide, the UNGC (1948) also recognized conspiracy, direct and
public incitement, complicity, and attempts to commit genocide as punishable acts under
international law.
The definition of genocide created by the UNGC was significantly narrower than that of
Lemkin’s original interpretation. The UNGC limited its understanding of ‘groups’ to exclude
political and social groups and ultimately omitted Lemkin’s (1944) concept of cultural genocide
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and social death. Arguably, the most significant change made by the UNGC (1948) from that of
Lemkin’s original conceptualization of the crime, is arguably its inclusion of “intent to destroy”
(UNGC, 1948, 2). This inclusion of ‘intent’ differs from Lemkin’s understanding of the crime,
because he recognized any act that resulted in the destruction of a group as an act of genocide,
but under international law an act is only that of genocide if it was committed with the intent of
destroying a group. Ultimately, this inclusion of intent further narrowed and restricted the
applicability of the crime of genocide under international law.
2. Genocide after Lemkin and the Genocide Convention
Even though the definition of genocide created by the UNGC is currently the only legally
enforceable one, scholars continue to interpret and create new definitions of genocide. Drost
(1959) was the first scholar to re-examine the concept following its official codification in 1951.
Unlike Lemkin (1948), who was upset that the UNHRC excluded cultural genocide, Drost
(1959) voiced his pleasure in the fact that the term had been excluded. While he recognized a
group’s culture as an inherent part of their identity, which deserves international protection, he
ultimately felt that the infringement on a group’s culture was largely a matter of human rights
and not that of genocide. He understood genocide as exclusively referring to “the deliberate
destruction of the physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any
human collectivity” (Drost, 1959). More precisely, he recognized genocide as a type of "group
murder,” that does not require the complicity of a states’ government and can occur despite the
government’s best effort to prevent it. His overall conceptualization of genocide largely
correlated with that of the legal definition, but he did disagree with the convention’s choice to
exclude political groups, which he recognized as requiring protection against genocide under
international law.
9

Similar to Drost, both Arendt (1964) and Horowitz (1976) criticized the UNGC for its
narrow and restrictive understanding of ‘victim’ groups. Deviating from Drost (1959), who
recognized genocide capable of occurring without the complicity of a state, both Arendt (1964)
and Horowitz (1976) emphasized the role of the state or the bureaucratic characteristic inherent
to genocide. Arendt (1964) specifically criticized the legal definition of genocide, for creating
what she considers a prejudice, which implies that foreign nations and groups of other races are
the only victims of genocide. While she emphasized that genocidal acts are directed against any
type of group, she understood genocide as only capable of being perpetrated by a state or other
bureaucratic perpetrator.
Horowitz (1976) similarly understood genocide as acts perpetrated by a state’s
government against any innocent minority group. He referred to genocide as “a structural and
systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus” (Horowitz: 1976,
18). More precisely, he recognized genocide as a “systematic effort over time to liquidate a
national population, usually a minority,” (Horowitz: 1976, 18). While the work of Drost, Arendt,
and Horowitz aimed to develop a deeper understanding of the crime of genocide, the emphasis
these scholars placed on the role of the state ultimately led to a wider debate concerning the
relationship between genocide and the state.
3. Mass Murder, the State, and the Liberal Paradigm
The academic atmosphere of the 1980s was largely characterized by various scholar’s
attempts to redefine “genocide” as exclusively referring to cases in which mass murder was
perpetrated by a state. Moses (2004) labeled this view as the “liberal paradigm,” in which
scholars increasingly emphasized the physical death of the victim group and the role of the state
in perpetrating genocide. Most scholars who held this view often recognized the Holocaust as the
10

model for all genocides. Horowitz (1984), Barbara Harff (1984), and Chalk and Jonassohn
(1990) best exemplify this view. All three scholars excluded non-lethal techniques from their
interpretation of genocide and only recognized instances of mass killings as constituting
genocide. Horowitz (1984) expanded upon his previous work and defined genocide as a
systematic act, which is highly organized and always perpetrated by a state’s government against
a minority. Specifically, he understood the crime as the “collective murder” of a group, which he
says was most apparent in the holocaust. Various liberal scholars held this view of the Holocaust
as the ‘model genocide’ at the time. Harff (1986) similarly held this view and echoed
Horowitz’s emphasis of the state’s essential role in perpetrating genocide. According to her
conceptulization, genocide amounts to a “form of state terror” or pre-meditated mass murder
perpetrated by the state or a groups closely associated with the state (Harff, 1984).
Similarly, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) identified genocide as “a form of one sided mass
killings in which a state or other authority intended to destroy a group as defined by the
perpetrator,” (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990 and Curthoys and Docker, 2008). While Chalk and
Jonassohn recognized the destruction of a culture as a serious crime, unlike Horowitz and Harff,
the authors refer to this as a distinctly separate crime, which they labeled ‘ethnocide’. Helen Fein
(1990) similarly emphasized the role of physical death, but found Chalk and Johassohn’s
conception, as well as that of Horowitz and Harff, as severely limited due to what she considered
their overemphasis on the state’s role as the perpetrator. She conceived genocide as “a sustained,
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly,
through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained
regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.”
4. The State, Intent, and the Post-Liberal Paradigm
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While Fein’s conception of genocide more closely reflected that of Lemkin’s, Moses
(2003) cites that her understanding of genocide was still widely criticized by ‘post-liberal
theorists’ for excluding the destruction of a culture. Moses specifically referred to ‘post-liberal
theorists,’ as representing the opposite side of the previously identified paradigm. Post-liberal
theorists, such Kuper (1980), Barta (1987) and Churchill (1997), largely condemned the liberal
paradigm as having created a narrow and restricting definition of genocide.
Kuper (1980) and Barta (1987) rightfully condemned the view that genocide only occurs
as a systematic and state sponsored attack, which results in the destruction of human groups in
their entirety. Both scholars condemned this view, as it ignores a significant portion of genocidal
acts. Barta (1987) rather understood genocide as occurring because of either a genocidal state or
a genocidal society, which he understood as two inherently different entities. A genocidal state
was similar to that of the liberal view in that the state intentionally perpetrates a genocide on a
group. He considered a society genocidal when the state, regardless of its intent, consciously or
unconsciously subjects a whole group to “remorseless pressures of destruction inherent in the
very nature of the society” (Barta, 1987, 239).
Churchill (1987) also provided an alternative to the liberal view of intent. Specifically, he
understood genocide as having various ‘degrees’ based upon the perpetrators “exterminatory
intent” (Stone, 2008, 12). He modeled this notion of ‘exterminatory intent’ upon US homicide
laws and therefore recognized genocide based upon the degree and severity of the act. Both
Churchill and Moses (2003) condemned the common view held by liberal theorists, which
emphasized the uniqueness of the Holocaust as the only true genocide. Eventually, those
theorists who recognized the Holocaust as the only true genocide were recognized as Holocaust
scholars, rather than genocide scholars. While genocide scholars abandoned the holocaust as a
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unique phenomenon, a significant number of scholars continue to emphasize physical death and
harm as the primary characteristic of genocide. Despite this, Moses (2003) recognized that the
debate between liberal and post-liberal scholars to has reached an impasse.
5. Structural Causes and the Effect of Colonialism
Following the atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, genocide studies emerged
as its own distinct academic field, in which scholars have become more concerned with
understanding genocide for the purpose of preventing and prosecuting it (Cuthoys and Docker,
2008). Compared to the previous research, which focused on redefining genocide, recent
genocide literature primarily analyzes the structural causes of genocide (Bloxham and Moses,
2010). Like Jones (2008) who analyzed the relationship between gender and genocide or Shaw
(2010) in his examination of genocide from a sociological perspective.
Within the last two decades’ the genocide field has witnessed an increase in studies
regarding the specific relationship between settler-colonialism and genocide. Scholars such as
Barta (1986), Patrick Wolfe (2006), and Dirk Moses (2010) have largely re-examined the works
of Lemkin and Sartre regarding the apparent association between colonialism and genocide.
Kuper (1980) was one of the first to recognize the validity of Sartre’s (1967) controversial
position on settler-colonialism. Specifically, Sartre (1967) recognized colonization as by its
“very nature an act of cultural genocide,” because the acquisition of inhabited territory from the
native group by the colonial state, systematically liquidates the characteristic of that native
group’s society away from the land (Cuthoys and Docker, 2008, 15). While Kuper (1980) felt
that Sartre’s analysis was undermined by several overgeneralizations, he ultimately
acknowledged the validity of Sartre’s position and further expanded upon his theory in order to
include decolonization, as well. He specifically understood colonization as creating “dangerously
13

plural or divided societies,” which forces different groups together and may later lead to
systematic violence and genocide upon the eventual decolonization of the region (Kuper, 1981
and Curthoys and Docker, 2008).
Similarly, Barta (1987), Wolfe (2006), and Bloxham and Moses (2008), have examined
the relationship between settler-colonialism and genocide. These scholars have largely come to
understand the settler-colonial process of taking land from indigenous groups as inherently
destructive to the native group, and therefore genocidal, regardless of whether this destruction
was the settler’s intent. Wolf (2006) specifically, understands settler colonialism as a structure,
rather than an individual event, in which settler-colonial societies create ‘pervasive inequalities,
which are usually codified in law, between the settler and indigenous populations’ (Moses,
2008). Scholars have increasingly begun to examine the effect of colonialization in specific cases
in order to determine whether this relationship resulted in long-term genocidal effects.
6. Settler-Colonialism and Ethnic Cleansing in Palestine
While numerous case studies have scrutinized the effects of settler-colonialism in the
Americas, Africa, and Latin America, a number of scholars have recently begun to examine the
settler-colonial relationship between Israel and Palestine. Pappé (2005), Shaw (2010), Docker
(2012), Lloyd (2012), Rashed and Short (2012), and Rashed, Short and Docker (2014) have all
analyzed the 1948 conflict from a settler-colonial perspective. In this relationship, these scholars
recognize the Zionist Jews as the ‘settlers’ and the ‘Arab Palestinians’ as the indigenous
population. These scholars specifically, consider the destructive settler-colonial relationship as
having originated within the Zionist movement itself, due to the nationalistic nature of the
movement, which called for the development of an exclusively Jewish state in an area that was
largely populated by Arab Palestinians.
14

Pappé (2005) was one of the first to view Zionism from a settler colonial perspective. His
analysis specifically understood Zionist hostilities and the early planning of Israelis to transfer
Arabs out of the territory, as evidence of ethnic cleansing. Docker (2012) later utilized Pappé’s
findings, and theory developed by Lemkin, in order to understand the historiography of the
conflict from a settler-colonial perspective. His analysis specifically argued that Israel and the
Zionist movement previously and continue to commit genocide against the Palestinian people
with the intent of further settling Israelis in the contested area. While Docker frames the entirety
of his article upon the relationship between settler-colonialism and genocide, Shaw (2010) just
barely acknowledges the existence of such a relationship in his own work. The two scholars
differ significantly in their understanding of settler-colonialism and its effect upon the ongoing
Palestinian crisis. Shaw (2013) considers the work of Docker (2012) and that of Rasheed and
Short (2012) to have implied a much closer relationship between settler-colonialism and
genocide than what he feels is justified. According to the Shaw (2013), this understanding of the
conflict from a settler-colonial perspective does not recognize the actual cause of the conflict nor
does it acknowledge genocidal acts, which he considers not to involve colonial settlement.
While Shaw (2010) and Docker (2012) differ significantly regarding their understanding
of the role of settler-colonialism in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict in 1948, both scholars
agree that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is genocide and that the actions taken by Israel in 1948 constitute as
a genocide. Shaw (2010) later criticized Pappé’s work for labeling the 1948 conflict between
Israeli-Jews and Arab Palestinians as an ‘ethnic cleansing’, as he considers ethnic cleansing to be
an aspect of genocide and not an alternative to ‘genocide’. Shaw (2013) similarly criticized the
works of both Rasheed and Short (2012) and Alsheh (2012) as having over emphasized the role
of settler-colonialism and as having not established a full understanding of the conflict.
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Regardless, he recognized the importance of their analyses in strengthening the argument that
Israel’s actions during 1948 were that of a genocide. While Rasheed and Short (2012) and
Alsheh (2012) both label the conflict as genocide, they ultimately differ in their understanding of
it. Rasheed and Short (2012) recognize Israel’s expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 as having
targeted Palestinians as a distinct national group, whereas Alsheh (2012) identifies the entirety
of Palestinian society as the target of genocide. Regardless of why Israeli Jews targeted
Palestinians, Rashed et, al (2014) understands Israel’s actions during the conflict as having
caused the ‘social death’ of Palestinian people.
While these scholars support Shaw’s (2010) conception of the conflict as genocide rather
than ethnic cleansing, various scholars disagree. Pensal (2013) agrees with Pappé’s (2005)
analysis and understand the acts committed in 1949 by Israel not as genocide, but rather as ethnic
cleansing. He makes this distinction due to the relatively low number of Palestinians killed
during the conflict. Holocaust scholar Bartov (2010), on the other hand, strongly opposed the
labeling of the 1948 conflict as a genocide and has also refrained from classifying the events as
ethnic cleansing. In an academic exchange with Shaw (2010), Bartov (2010) criticized Shaw for
what he considers as the inflation of ethnic cleansing to that of the crime of genocide. He
specifically referred to Shaw’s understanding of genocide as so general that it has become
historically meaningless. While Bartov refused to consider the actions taken by Israel in 1948 as
either genocide, or ethnic cleansing, he conceded that the logic of Zionism might have promoted
at the most ‘population displacement’. Ultimately, Bartov (2010) condemned his analysis as
groundless, prejudicial, anti-sematic and as having intended to delegitimize the State of Israel.
7. Memoricide and Nakba
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Holocaust scholars like Bartov, are not the only people to largely disregard the violence
and forced exodus of Palestinians in 1948 as a possible genocide deserving of analysis. Up until
recently, the majority of genocide scholars have completely disregarded the experience of
Palestinians when analyzing such relevant concepts as settler-colonialism, ethnic cleansing, and
nation building. Rasheed et, al (2014) has referred to this gap within genocide literature as an act
of memoricide, in itself. Pappé (2005) first defined memoricide as acts which ‘erase the history
of one people in order to write that of another people’s over it,’ (Pappé: 2005, 231). He
identified this memoricide in the Palestinian case as the ‘master plan of expulsion and
destruction’ of Palestinian culture through the replacement of ‘de-Arabisation with Judaisation’
(Pappé: 2005, 231). Docker (2012) also examined the act of memoricide in Israel-Palestine and
understood memoricide as an inherent feature of colonization. In the case of the IsraelPalestinian conflict, he explicitly refers to Israel’s actions as a colonial actor as having attempted
to erase Palestinians from history through the destruction of Palestinian land, architecture, and
art.
Rashed et, al (2014) also analyzed this memoricide in the context of Israel’s ‘Nakba
denial’. Nakba means catastrophe in Arabic and is the term used by Palestinians and Israeli
Arabs to refer to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of indigenous Palestinians during the
formation of Israel in 1948 (Masalha 2007, 1). According to Sarah (2012) the Nakba has come to
suggest a duel meaning which refers both to the forced exodus of Palestinians in 1948, while also
referring to their ongoing daily suffering because of their separation from their families, homes,
and land. Massad (2008), best exemplifies this suffering when he refers to the 60th anniversary of
the Nakba as not being an anniversary, ‘but rather one more year of enduring its brutality; that
the history of the Nakba has never been a history of the past but decidedly a history of the
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present’ (Massad, 2008,). While this event has been examined as genocide, the active denial of
its existence requires further analysis and Pappé (2005), Docker (2012), and Rashed et, al (2014)
have all explicitly called for further analysis in order to understand the current conflict and
subsequently find peace.
According to the Rashed et, al (2014), the lack of research on the Nakba has allowed the
Zionist narrative to remain largely unquestioned both by Israelis and Western academics, which
has resulted in a wide scale denial of the Palestinians experiences during the Nakba. Abu-Saad
(2008), Black (2009), and Rashed (2014) understand Israeli’s continuous denial of the Nakba as
a tool to suppress Arab-Palestinian identity, which should be recognized as an act of genocide.
The suppression of Palestinian identity, according to Black (2009) and Rashed (2014), was
officially codified within Israel’s national legislation. This is apparent in Israel’s 2009 banning of
the word ‘Nakba’ within Palestinian schools, and the ‘Budget Foundation Law’ or ‘Nakba law’,
which withholds state funding from institutions, which recognizes or commemorates the Nakba.
Rashed et, al (2014) recognizes these policies and the active denial of the Nakba as acts as a
cultural genocide, which he refers to as part of a larger structural settler-colonial genocide that
began in 1948 and continues today.
8. The Occupation, the Gaza War, and Operation Protective Edge
As detailed by Rashed et, al (2014), genocide scholars have largely ignored the current
situation in Israel and Palestine as a possible genocide case study, despite its clear relevance to
the genocide field. Considering Lemkin’s (1944) emphasis on the relationship between genocide,
occupation and war, the minimal scholarly research regarding the topic is surprising. Lendman
(2008), Cook (2008), Rashed and Short (2012), and Rashed et, al (2014) have all examined the
occupation and the detrimental effects it has had on the Palestinians. While Cook (2008) does not
18

regard the occupation itself as a genocide, he does refer to the ongoing occupation as a form of
ethnic cleansing and implies that Palestinians may one day face their own genocide. He also
credits the ongoing occupation as having forced Palestinian society into “an almost permanent
state of social, economic and political underdevelopment,” (Cook: 2012, 32). Chomsky and
Pappé (2011) came to a similar conclusion when they condemned Israel’s occupation for directly
causing the ghettoization of Palestine.
Lendman (2008) and Rashed and Short (2012) were more specific in their analysis of the
occupation. Their study specifically examined the effects of what they refer to as Israel’s
‘collective punishment’ of Palestine in 2007-2008 following the election of Hamas. Both works
recognize Israel’s implementation of the 2007 air, water and land blockade as having intended to
restrict the movement of Palestinians, cripple their economy, and inflict conditions intended to
endanger the life and health of Palestinian people. In their analysis, Rashed and Short (2012) also
scrutinized Israel’s Nakba laws, economic sanctions and actions taken during Operation Cast
Lead as acts of genocide. They are not alone in their understanding of the 2008 to 2009 conflict
as a genocidal campaign. Chomsky and Pappé (2011) also condemned Israel for its use of
excessive force and denial of medical personal into Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. While
Pappé refrained from labeling the conflict a genocide, Chomsky considers the IDF’s attacks as
genocide, due to their systematic targeting of Palestinian universities, industries and necessary
resources. As such, Chomsky and Pappé (2011) and Rashed and Short (2012) recognized Israel’s
actions as planned attacks intended to collectively punish and destroy Gaza’s society as a whole.
Despite the fact that the 2014 Israel-Gaza War occurred nearly three years ago, genocide
scholars have largely ignored the recent conflict as a genocidal case study. Max Blumenthal
(2014) and the Russell Tribunal on Palestine (2014) are the only known sources to have
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examined the 2014 Israel-Gaza war as a possible genocide. Blumenthal’s (2014) examination of
the conflict recognized the actions taken by Israel as that of a genocide and a ‘politicide’, which
he defined as ‘partial or total destruction of a community of people with a view to deny them
self-determination,” (Blumenthal, 2015, 14). His analysis determined that the actions and
statements made by members within Israel’s nationalist and religious far right wing incited
genocidal violence and forced a significant number of Israel’s moderate party to flee the political
arena.
Blumenthal later offered his own legal analysis to the Russell Tribunal on Palestine. The
Russell Tribunal on Palestine 3 (2014) conducted its own citizen’s tribunal, in response to the
devastating effects the conflict has had on Gaza’s population. This tribunal specifically examined
Israel’s actions as possible war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide. Upon
hearing the testimonies of legal experts and relevant actors, the tribunal found that numerous
actions taken by Israel during the conflict legally amounted to war crimes and crimes against
humanity. In regards to the crime of genocide, the tribunal found Israeli leaders guilty of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide. Concerning the overall conflict, the tribunal
recognized Israel’s acts as genocidal but due to a lack of specific intent, the tribunal refrained
from officially declaring the conflict a genocide. Ultimately, the court concluded its analysis by
highlighting its concerns that the systematic impunity of Israeli officials, the IDF, and Israeli
citizens will lead to a genocide, if one has not already begun.

3

The Russell Tribunal on Palestine (2014) is an International People’s tribunal created by citizens actively involved
in the promotion of peace and justice in the Middle East.
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Chapter 2—Methodology
Upon examining the relevant literature regarding the ongoing Israeli and Palestinian
conflict; it is apparent that there is a need for further investigation of the topic from a genocide
perspective. While genocide scholars have examined the conflict, the research has primarily
focused on the role of settler-colonialism and the events that occurred in 1948. Since the
available literature has largely refrained from examining the current occupation and most recent
military conflict, the field of study could significantly benefit from a contemporary analysis of
the most recent 2014 military conflict. While Max Blumenthal and the Russell Tribunal on
Palestine previously examined the 2014 Israel-Gaza War from a genocidal perspective, both
investigations exclusively examined the actions taken by Israel and completely ignored those
taken by Hamas and various Palestinian armed groups. Therefore, a more thorough and unbiased
analysis of the 2014 conflict is needed in order to fully understand the conflict as a whole and
one day achieve durable peace between the two nations.
This analysis seeks to answer the question to what extent the actions taken by Israel and
Palestine since June 2014, constitute as genocide as defined by the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC). I choose this legal definition and
the specific period under investigation because of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC)
ongoing preliminary examination. As the ICC’s legal jurisdiction is limited to only those actions,
which occurred in the Gaza strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem after June of 2014, there is a
pressing need to examine the actions taken by Israeli and Palestinian actors during this time as
possible acts of genocide. As this analysis is primarily concerned with the actions taken by
Israeli and Palestinian actors during the military conflict in Gaza, this analysis will only examine
actions taken in the Gaza Strip, and not the West Bank or East Jerusalem. Future studies should
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analyze the actions taken within the West Bank and East Jerusalem during and following the
2014 Israel-Gaza War as possible acts of genocide according to international law.
1. The Legal Conceptualization of the Crime of Genocide
While genocide scholars recognize a variety of definitions and acts that are not included
in the UNGC’s definition of genocide, as it is the only definition that is legally enforceable under
international law and therefore for the purpose of this empirical analysis genocide is understood
as such. The UNGC explicitly recognizes five acts as acts that may constitute as genocide, but
these acts are only genocidal if they are committed with the “intent to destroy” a group “in whole
or in part” (UNGC, 1948: 1). While international actors and genocide scholars interpret ‘intent’
as an explicit policy or clear directive by the state to destroy a group, the United Nations Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) and the precedent set by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) specify that this intent can be inferred from various
actions committed by an actor (OSAPG, n/a and Human Rights Watch, 2010). Specifically, the
ITCR determined that in cases in which explicit intent is not clear, intent is often inferred from
the alleged perpetrators words, deeds, or “patterns of purposeful action” (Human Rights Watch,
2010: 16). The OSAPG and the ITCR have both identified specific factors, which may indicate a
perpetrators intent to destroy a group in whole, or in part, some of which include:
“the use of derogatory language against members of the victim group; the general
context of the acts; the scale and systematic nature of the acts; the type of weapons used;
the extent of bodily harm; the number of individuals in a group effected; the targeting of
that groups property; and the relative proportionality of the attempted or achieved
destruction of a group” (OSAPG, n/a and Human Rights Watch, 2010).
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This does not include all acts, which may indicate a perpetrator’s intent to destroy a group in
‘whole or in part,’ but these acts were highlighted due to their specific relevance to large-scale
military conflicts.
Additionally, while the UNGC does not clearly define what constitutes as the destruction
of a group “in whole or in part”, the OSAPG and the ITCR recognize this destruction as
exclusively referring to the physical or biological destruction of a group (Human Rights Watch,
2010). While the actual extermination of a group does not have to occur, in order to constitute as
“in whole or in part” the perpetrators acts must have been intended to destroy a “substantial
number of individuals” from that group (Human Rights Watch, 2010:28 and OSAPG, n/a). As
defined by the UNHC, this physical destruction can occur through five specific acts.
The first act, killing members of a group, while widely recognized as the most visible
aspect of genocide, is not legally required to occur in order for a genocide to have taken place.
This means that under international law genocide can occur, even if one person was never killed.
As such, under international law in order to constitute as a violation of article 2 (a) of the UNGC,
‘killing’ is understood as “homicide” in which the perpetrator intentionally killed one or more
individuals, due to their membership or perceived membership within the targeted group (Human
Rights Watch, 2010, 48).
The second recognized act of genocide prohibits causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of a specific group, and is slightly more ambiguous than the first and has undergone a
significant amount of legal analysis. For the purpose of this analysis, the conceptualization of
serious bodily harm is based upon the legal precedent set within the Ntabakuze and
Nsengiyumva, 2008 Trial Chamber decision. This decision understood serious bodily harm as
“serious acts of physical violence falling short of killing that seriously injure the health, cause
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disfigurement, or cause any serious injury to the external or internal organs or senses.” (Human
Rights Watch, 2010, 53). In regards to mental harm, precedent set within the Akayesu judgement
requires that mental harm exceed “temporary unhappiness, embarrassment, or humiliation” and
must result in “grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and
constructive life,” (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 54). While this precedent requires that mental
harm be more than temporary in order to constitute as an act of genocide, this mental or physical
harm does not have to result in permanent or irremediable damage. Ultimately, instances
involving serious mental or physical harm must be addressed in a case-by-case basis in order to
determine whether they violate article 2 (b) of the UNGC.
The third act of genocide prohibits “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” is relatively
straightforward under international law (The UNGC, 1948, 2). The ICTR has understood
conditions of life calculated to bring about a groups physical destruction, as the purposeful
infliction of “circumstances which will lead to a slow death” of a group (Human Rights Watch,
2010, 56). The ICTR and the OSPAG have specifically recognized “lack proper housing,
clothing, hygiene, and medical care” as conditions which bring about the physical destruction of
the group as a whole or in part. The relevant case, which prohibits “imposing measures intended
to prevent births within a group” is relatively limited, but the ICTR’s legal interpretation of this
act has explicitly recognized “sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control,
separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages” (The UNGC, 1948, 1 and Human Rights
Watch, 2010, 57). The relevant legal precedent concerning article 2 (e), is relatively
straightforward as well, as it understands the forcible transferring of children from one group to
the other, as just that.
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When any one of these acts are inflicted against individuals of a group with the intent to
destroying that group, the act or acts constitute as genocide under international law. These acts
are illegal regardless of whether they actually result in the crime of genocide. According to the
UNGC (1948) “the direct and public incitement to commit genocide” is also a punishable act
under international law regardless of whether genocide occurred. While the UNGC recognizes
incitement to commit genocide as a crime under international law, what this entails is still
relatively ambiguous and has subsequently been subject to various legal interpretations. The
ICTR has specifically recognize the crime of incitement as the direct provocation of a group to
commit genocide against another group, either through speeches, shouting, verbal threats, or
through the dissemination of similarly provocative written or printed text (Human Rights Watch,
2010: 64).
In order to constitute as incitement to commit genocide, this ‘provocation’ must be direct
and public. Under international law, ‘direct’ incitement requires that the statements or action be
“more than vague or indirect suggestions of incitement,” and rather having specifically having
intended to “provoke another to engage in criminal conduct” (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 65).
Proving that a statement directly intended to incite genocide is not enough, this statement or
action must also have been ‘public’ in order to constitute as inciting genocide. In order to
constitute as ‘public,’ the statement or action must be made in a public place or to members of
the public, through mass media such as radio or television. While the available legal doctrine
does not explicitly refer to social media or the internet, as there has not been a recent criminal
hearing regarding the crime of incitement since the rise of social media, this analysis understands
published statements made on social media as a ‘public’ statement.
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2. A Single Case Study and the use of Secondary Data
This legal conceptualization of genocide is applied within this analysis in order to
determine whether the actions taken by Israeli and Palestinian actors legally constitute as
genocide. For this study, I primarily followed Robert Yin (2013) while conducting my case study
analysis. I utilized a case study design, as it is best suited to understand such complex social
phenomena, like genocide, and investigate real-life situations in which the investigator has “little
control over the events” (Yin, 2013, 10). As this method is more comprehensive and
encompassing than other designs, this type of research design is best suited to conduct a
thorough analysis of the 2014 Israel-Gaza War, as a case study design is capable of dealing with
a large variety of evidence and conceptual conditions concerning the definition of genocide.
As this study primarily seeks to understand and compare the actions taken by Israeli and
Palestinian actors during the 2014 Israel-Gaza War as possible acts of genocide, I chose to
conduct a single case study based upon the location and specific event in question, rather than a
comparative study comparing two differing cases. This design ultimately allows for a clearer
understanding of why the war started and what exactly happened throughout the fifty-one-day
long conflict (Yin, 2013). As the conflict under investigation occurred nearly three years ago and
took place across the other side of the world, collecting my own data was impracticable. As a
result, I conducted my analysis exclusively utilizing secondary data, as it was the only feasible
means of gaining relevant and reliable data on the conflict.
Since this case study is only examining the individual case of the most recent 2014 IsraelGaza War, when choosing my data on the conflict, I only included data published after June
2014. As the 2014 war involves a large amount of information, in order to gain a basic
understanding of the conflict my first wave of research solely included large-scale reports
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regarding the conflict as a whole. Ultimately, the majority of my data was collected from the
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 2015 Report of the detailed findings of the
independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S21/1*** (UNHRC, 2015). The UNHRC (2015) conducted its own independent inquiry into the
conflict, which collected victim and witness testimonies via skype and telephone. While the
UNHRC attempted to perform various onsite fact-finding missions, the state of Israel never
granted the commission access to the Occupied Palestinian Territory or into Israel. In order to
collect data, the UNHRC commission also utilized secondary data from trusted resources such as
non-governmental organization, human rights organizations, and international law experts.
As the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is independent from the main
governing body of the UN, the data received from this report possess minimal bias and
discrepancies. As no report can be fully without bias, I utilized this source as my primary set of
data and continued to fact check and collect additional data relating to events or concepts of
relevance addressed in the UNHRC report. While researching for more specific information, in
order to ensure that the data utilized in my study was as factual and free of bias as possible, I
primarily utilized reports and investigations conducted by international organizations such as the
United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the World Health Organization,
the World Bank and various regional human rights organizations.
The data collected ultimately provided me with a relatively complete understanding of
the 2014 conflict. Based upon the analysis of the data, specific actions taken by Israeli and
Palestinian actors during the 2014 conflict were identified as possible violations of genocide
under international law. Specifically, this analysis identified the crime of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide and the crime of genocide itself. In regards to the crime of
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genocide, based upon the conceptualization of the five recognized acts of genocide and the
analysis of the data collected, evidence was identified supporting a need for further analysis into
possible violations of the UNGC concerning article 2 (a), (b), and (c). Ultimately, the
information available within the secondary data analysis did not support the need for a deeper
analysis concerning the last two crimes of genocide. Ultimately, this study sought to utilize the
data collected in order to provide a better understanding of the Palestinian conflict as a possible
genocide and determine to what extent Israeli and Palestinian actions constitute as genocide
under international law. This is necessary in order to; more fully understand the conflict and the
experiences suffered by Israeli-Jews and Arab-Palestinians as members of religious-national
group.
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Chapter 3—Understanding the History of the Conflict
While scholars generally assume that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict began in
1948, following the creation of the Jewish state, this is an oversimplification. (Tesler, 2009). It is
often forgotten that Israelis and Palestinians share a far deeper history that spans back as far as
ancient times, to when the two groups identified themselves exclusively as ‘Jews’ and ‘Arabs,’
and not as Israeli-Jews or Arab-Palestinian. For hundreds of years, the two groups lived together
in relative harmony as Semitic people. Due to this shared history, the two groups gradually
developed national identities inherently based upon their cultural and religious roots to what is
now the contested territory of Israel and Palestine.
The concept of national identity did not truly develop until the late nineteenth century,
when individuals in Europe began to identify themselves as members of a nation that deserved
the right to rule themselves (Benin, J and Hajjar, L, 2014). This desire for sovereignty and selfdetermination quickly spread throughout the world and almost immediately manifested itself
through the Zionist movement. As the Jews were forcibly spread throughout the world due to the
diaspora4, the Zionist movement sought to reunify the Jewish people through the creation of a
national state in the Jewish holy land, located in what was then Ottoman ruled Arab territory.
While scholars such as Pappé (2005) and Shaw (2010) exclusively identify the development of
the Zionist movement in 1897 as having sparked the conflict, it is often ignored or forgotten, that
a similar nationalist movement also emerged among the Arab population at the time (Tessler,
2009). Arabs throughout the Middle East sought to over throw, first the Ottoman Empire and

4

The Jewish diaspora refers to the forced exile or scattering of Israelities, Judahites, and the Jews from their
religious home land, of what is now the state of Israel (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017). While this occurred
throughout history, the primary diaspora occurred in 70AD when the Romans forced Jews to leave Jerusalem and
what was then Palestine. As a result of this ‘diaspora’, Jews were forced to relocate throughout the world and
were not relocated under a single Jewish state until the establishment of Israel in 1948.
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then later British colonial rule, in order to create their own autonomous region of Arab nation
states. While the two groups of people had previously been able to cooperate and live in peace
with one another, as an increased number of Jews began to resettle the area, it would soon
become clear that Zionism and Arab nationalism were fundamentally incompatible (Tessler,
2009).
Between 1916 and 1948, relationships between Jews and Arab’s steadily deteriorated as a
result of vapidly increasing Jewish settlement, the colonization of the territory by Britain through
the British Mandate for Palestine and most notably over the promised development of two
separate states for Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians (Israel Profile, 2017). Following World
War II and the Holocaust, the General Assembly created the U.N. Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP), with the intent of creating a feasible solution for both the Jewish and Arab
population living in Palestine (Palestinian territories timeline, 2015). On November 29, 1947, the
UN General Assembly officially agreed to partition the British Mandated for Palestine into two
separate states, in which the UN would govern the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem as
recognized international zones. At the end of 1946, UNSCO found the population of Palestine to
have been approximately 1,846,000, in which 65 percent were Arabs (1,203,000) and 33 percent
Jewish (608,000). Despite having the larger population, the partition plan allotted the Jewish
state more territory on the assumption that Jewish immigration would increase in the region due
to their displacement and genocide in Europe.
1. Independence and War
Immediately, Palestinians and the Arab region as a whole rejected the partition plan
(Israel Profile, 2017). While the Zionist leadership publically accepted the proposal, both sides
prepared for war and fighting erupted almost immediately following the end of the British
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Mandate. Despite having a smaller population, Zionist forces were significantly more organized
and armed than the Arab Palestinians. By April of 1948, Zionists had gained control over the
territory allotted to them and had begun to expand into territory that was designated to Arab
Palestinian by the UN’s partition plan (Benin, J and Hajjar, L, 2014). Less than a month later,
Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion announced the established the Jewish State of Israel on May
14, 1948. This declaration officially began the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 in which Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon declared war and subsequently invaded the Jewish state (Palestinian
territories timeline, 2015). The war lasted for roughly a year and by April of 1949, all of the
conflicting Arab states had signed their own individual Armistice Agreements with the State of
Israel, officially ending the violence and first Arab-Israeli War.
Due to the conflict, Israel was victorious and successfully expanded its territory beyond
the original partition borders, to possess over 77 percent of what had previously been the Britishmandate of Palestine (Benin, J and Hajjar, L, 2014). Jordan and Egypt took control of what was
left of Palestine; Jordan occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem, whereas Egypt controlled
the Gaza Strip (Palestinian territories timeline, 2015). As a result of the violence and Israel’s
significant expansion, over 700,000 Arab Palestinians voluntarily left or were forcibly expelled
from the territory as refugees. While a great deal of those Palestinians relocated to the West
Bank and Gaza strip, significant numbers were instead settled into refugee camps within Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria 5(Palestinian territories timeline, 2015).

5

Despite the 1949 the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) and Resolution 194, which ensured Palestinian refugees the right to return, the large
majority of the population has been restricted from doing so.”
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2. An Uneasy Peace and Three Decades of Conflict
Despite the armistice agreement, Israeli and Arab relations remained strained following
the war. Throughout most of the 1950s, political leaders and media outlets on both sides of the
conflict regularly engaged in provocative dialogue and political warfare, often resulting in
violent skirmishes (Israel Profile, 2017). A noticeable skirmish occurred in 1956, when Great
Britain and France gained control of the Suez Canal and Israel successfully captured the entirety
of the Gaza Strip and Syrian Sinai Peninsula. Israel eventually returned these two territories and
for the next ten years, relations remained relatively tense, but no significant conflicts arose
between Israel and its surrounding Arab nations. Despite this relative ‘peace’, disputes continued
between Israel and Palestinian people, specifically in response to ongoing arguments over water
diversion projects and an increased rise in nationalism among Palestinians living in the contested
territory. In May of 1964, Ahmad Shuqeiri united Palestinians people under the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), which established an official national covenant, basic set of
laws, and an army (the Palestine Liberation Army) for the first time in occupied Palestine.
(Palestinian territories timeline, 2015).
A year later, Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordon in
response to the mobilization of Arab troops along Israel’s borders and Egyptian President
Nasser’s public declaration calling for the annihilation of the Jewish State (Benin and Hajjar,
2014). During what the Six Day War, Israel defeated Arab forces and ultimately regained control
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, as well as the Golan Heights (Benin and
Hajjar, 2014). While the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 242, which recognized
the national rights of Palestinians and called for the eventual withdrawal of Israel from territory
acquired during the Six Day War, Israel remains in the majority of these territories as an
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occupying power. As a result of this accusation of land, Israeli occupation and settlement
continued unabated for the next decade, which then led to the Yom Kippur War and the
Ramadan War in 1973 (Israel Profile, 2017). Between 1978 and 1981, Israel and Egypt signed
the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and an Arab nation at Camp David, which
officially established diplomatic relations and officially ended their ongoing war. As the first
Arab state to recognize Israel’s existence, Egypt regained control of the Sinai Peninsula. This
peace was short lived as Arab dissent in Egypt and other Arab nations led to the assassination of
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, which subsequently reignited tensions.
3. The First and Second Intifada
As a result of failed diplomatic efforts to reach a territorial compromise and the
continuous expansion of Israeli settlements into the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Palestinian
anger eventually erupted in widespread riots, demonstrations, and boycotts condemning Israel’s
occupation in the late 1980s (Tessler, 2009). Violent outbursts eventually intensified,
transforming into a coordinated uprising of thousands of Palestinian, known as the First Intifada.
From 1987 and 1991, approximately 20,000 Palestinians and Israelis were injured or killed
(Benin and Hajjar, 2014). After the First Intifada, which lasted nearly five years, the PLO and the
Israeli government were able to make significant progress towards peace despite the political
divisions in Palestine (Palestinian territories timeline, 2015). These divisions were largely due to
the increasing political rivalry between the PLO and the newly formed Hamas, an Islamic
resistance and extremist group (Benin and Hajjar, 2014). Despite this, during the 1990 Oslo
Accords Israel formally recognized the PLO as a legitimate governing entity and officially
granted Palestinians self-rule and elections throughout the occupied territory. These agreements
were significant not only because it was the first time Israel and Palestine explicitly recognized
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each other’s rights to exist as two separate states and national groups, but more important was
their official pledge towards peace and finding a lasting solution to end their dispute.
Despite this pledge for peace, later attempts to end the conflict at the 2000 Camp David II
Summit failed. The international community has largely cited this failure as having resulted from
Israeli Likud party leader Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the Haram al-Sharif, a sacred holy
site shared between Muslims and Jews. This visit and the end of the peace talks reignited
violence and provocation between Palestinians and Israelis, which eventually resulted in the
Second (al-Aqsa) Intifada (Klausner, 2002). This conflict was significantly more bloody and
violent than the first and has been viewed by numerous scholars and actors as an “armed conflict
short of war,” (Benin and Hajjar, 2014). The conflict lasted for five years and bore witness to an
increase in Hamas led suicide bombings and rocket attacks. In response to these attacks, Israel
officially reoccupied the West Bank and created the West Bank Security Wall, which currently
stands at roughly 200 miles in length (Harris, 2013). Despite international condemnation of the
structure, the wall remains in place today.
In 2005, Israeli and Palestinian officials, including Hamas, agreed to an official ceasefire
(Benin and Hajjar, 2014). While the ceasefire ended overt violence between Israel and Palestine,
tensions remained and significantly escalated in 2006 following Hamas’ electoral victory, in
which the extremist organization won a majority of the seats in Gaza (Wilson, 2006). In
response, Israel enacted a full air, land, and water blockage of the Gaza strip, which completely
restricted what imports or exports enter into the territory. While Israel has recently loosened
some of its restrictions on the Gaza strip, the blockade remains in full force. The United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has identified this blockade as
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severely undermining the living conditions in Gaza and as having further fragmented the overall
economic and social fabric of the occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA, 2017).
4. A Decade of ‘Operations’
In December 2008, tensions once again erupted in violence when Hamas fired rockets
into Southern Israel in response to the ongoing Gaza Blockade (Javid and Shamim, 2014). In
retaliation, Israel launched its own artillery barrage and armed invasion of Gaza. Operation Cast
Lead, or the Gaza War, lasted three weeks and resulted in the death of nearly 1,500 Palestinians
and 13 Israelis. Following the conflict, the international community has condemned both Israel
and Palestine for perceived war crimes and called for the creation of a durable peace (pro-con,
2017). Discussions for a two-state solution reemerged in 2009 when President Obama reaffirmed
his alliance with Israel, despite his condemnation of Israel’s continued settlement into the West
Bank, and his commitment to create two separate states (Sham, 2014). For four years the United
States, Israel, and Palestine seriously negotiated the creation of a sovereign state of Palestine,
which ultimately failed in 2012 when Israel refused to stop building settlements or contemplate
the possibility of returning to pre-1967 borders.
Nearly ten months after the failed peace negotiations, the two states acceded into violence
again. In response to Palestine’s campaign to elevate its UN status to that of a Non-Member
Observer State and renewed Hamas rocket attacks, Israel began its own military offensive,
known as Operation Pillar of Defense, in an attempt to overthrow Hamas militias and their
ability to launch attacks in Gaza (pro-con, 2017). The conflict lasted eight days, and killed nearly
174 Palestinians (Nebehav, 2012). Despite the conflict, the UN granted Palestine Non-Member
Observer State status, therefore recognizing the PLO and Palestine as a state. During this time of
peace, US Secretary John Kerry reignited peace talks for the first time since 2010 (Sham, 2014).
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The talks lasted ninety days, but subsequently failed due to rising tension between Israelis and
Palestinians following the kidnaping and murder of three Israeli teens by Hamas (Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2014).
While all three of the conflicts resulted in wide scale destruction and loss of life, the most
recent military conflict was the deadliest and most destructive. The 2014 Israel-Gaza War,
sometimes referred to as Operation Protective Edge, was fought primarily between the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas, and a variety of independent Palestinian armed groups. The war
lasted for seven weeks in which Palestinian rockets, Israeli air strikes and ground operations
killed over 2,300 Palestinians and 73 Israelis (Bannoura, 2014). Four months after the cease-fire,
Palestine acceded into the Rome Statute of the ICC, therefore granting the court’s jurisdiction to
investigate alleged war crimes committed in Gaza since the June 2014 conflict (ICC, 2017).
While the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the State of Israel, the ICC has opened a
preliminary examination into the military conflict. Although numerous national and international
organizations have publicized their concerns through inquires and investigations regarding
alleged violations of international law, the ICC preliminary examination is currently the only
formal criminal investigation into the conflict (ICC Preliminary report, 2016).
6. The Current ICC Preliminary Examination
The ICC is presently in the second phase of its preliminary examination regarding
“alleged crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since
June 13, 2014” (ICC Preliminary Examination Report, 2016, 25). According to the 2016 Report
on the ICC’s Preliminary Examination Activities, the Court has identified a number of alleged
crimes committed by Palestinian armed groups, Hamas, and the IDF, which may fall within the
court’s jurisdiction. The alleged crimes identified in the report are limited and may later be
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expanded upon depending on future analysis. Specific ‘alleged acts’ committed by Palestinian
armed groups during the 2014 Gaza Conflict include attacks against civilians, the use of
protected persons as shields, and ill-treatment of persons accused of being collaborators. Similar
‘alleged acts’ committed by the IDF have also been identified and include intentional attacks
against residential buildings and civilians, medical facilities and personnel, UNRWA schools,
and other civilian objects or infrastructure (ICC Preliminary Report, 2016, 28-29). Unlike other
preliminary examinations discussed within the 2016 Preliminary report, the ICC has thus far
refrained from officially classifying any of these alleged crimes as possibly amounting to
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or the newly created crime of aggression.
While the Court has not yet determined whether any of the alleged acts committed by the
IDF or various Palestinian armed groups fall within its subject-matter jurisdiction, numerous
international actors have referred to the actions taken by both sides of the conflict as ‘war
crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. Specifically, the UN Human Rights Council (2015)
Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict found that the actions committed
by the two states could amount to war crimes under international law, while Amnesty
International (2015) and the Russel Tribunal on Palestine (2014) recognize the alleged acts as
constituting as war crimes and crimes against humanity (Amnesty International, 2014).
Currently the only organization to examine the conflict as a possible genocide was the Russel
Tribunal on Palestine (2014), but this examination exclusively looked at the actions committed
by Israel and not those by Palestinian actors.
The international community’s near exclusive referral to the acts committed during this
conflict as war crimes or crimes against humanity is surprising considering the severity of the
violence and the inherent racial, religious and national differences associated with the overall
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conflict. Although the conflict as a whole appears as an ongoing dispute regarding territorial and
self-determination rights, as this examination of the history revealed, this conflict is inherently
rooted in ethnic, religious, and national differences between Israeli-Jews and Arab-Palestinians.
Due to these differences and the near century long conflict, Israeli and Palestinians have
polarized themselves as fundamentally different and seemingly incompatible national groups6.
While this polarization does not necessarily make the conflict inherently genocidal, the ethnic,
racial and national differences innate to the conflict and the systematic cycle of military conflicts
since 2007 may indicate that the most recent conflicts were not fought with legitimate military
objectives, but rather with the intent of committing genocide against the ‘other group’. The next
three chapters will therefore analyze the actions taken by Israeli and Palestinian actors during the
2014 Israel-Gaza War. Specifically, this next chapter will specifically identify whether or not the
Israeli and Palestinian actions leading up to the conflict constitute as direct and public incitement
to commit genocide.

6

the OSAPG (n.d) analysis of genocide has recognized that conflicts over land, group identity, power and security
as factors contributing to genocidal conflict. Considering the fact that the conflict is
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_analysis_framework.pdf

38

Chapter 4: Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
The last chapter briefly examined the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and briefly
addressed the crimes under investigation in the ICC’s current preliminary examination. This
examination of the history specifically highlighted the ethnic, religious, and national differences
between the two groups as Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. These differences and the
systematic cycle of violent conflicts since 2007 supported the need for further analysis the 2014
Israel-Gaza War. While the last chapter identified the ICC Preliminary Examination and current
crimes under investigation, ultimately the crime of genocide was not included. Therefore, this
analysis seeks to examine the conflict as a possible genocide. Before analyzing the actions taken
by Israel and Palestine during the official military conflict, this section will first examine the
events leading up to the 2014 Israel-Gaza War. Specifically, this chapter will determine whether
either group violated article 3(c) of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Genocide (UNGC), which prohibits the “direct and public incitement to commit genocide,” by
any person (UNGC, 1948, article 3(c)).
An examination of the events leading up to the conflict is necessary due to the extremely
hostile and racially charged atmosphere among Israelis and Palestinians. While the kidnapping
and murder of three Israeli teens on June 12, 2014 has largely been acknowledged as officially
reigniting hostile relations between Israel and Palestine, relations between the two groups were
already tense at the time due to the failure of the nearly ten month long US led peace
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Blumenthal, 2014). Due to Prime
Minister Netanyahu’s withdrawal from the peace talks, Israel canceled the promised prisoner
release of long-time Palestinian detainees. The international community has regarded as having
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caused significant anger and resentment among Palestinians, which seemingly motivated the
decision made by two rogue Hamas members to kidnap and murder three Israeli teens.
Despite the fact that the Israeli teens were murdered almost immediately after their
kidnaping on June 12, Israel’s investigation lasted for nearly three weeks (Blumenthal, 2014). In
this time, tensions arose among the Israeli and Palestinian public, which eventually erupted in
wide scale protests, riots, and a significant rise in inflammatory rhetoric between the two groups.
Within this racially charged atmosphere, Israeli authorities discovered the teen’s bodies on June
29 (Amnesty, 2014). Following this discovery, a significant rise in anti-Palestinian rhetoric
increased among Israeli citizens, which seemingly led to the revenge killing of a Palestinian teen
on June 2 by three Israelis. The discovery of the boy’s burned body was the final catalyst, which
reignited rocket attacks against Israel by Hamas and numerous Palestinian armed group, and
subsequently resulted in Israel’s own military operation in Gaza.
Although the collapse of the peace talks and the discovery of the teen’s bodies have been
recognized as having caused the racially motived killings, statements made by Palestinian and
Israeli officials during this time have also been understood as having largely contributed to the
racially charged atmosphere in which these acts occurred. The UN Human Rights Council’s
(2015) independent commission of inquiry report, which will be here on referred to as the
UNHRC report, condemned the actions taken by Israeli and Palestinian leaders and explicitly
called upon the two groups to actively “prevent statements that dehumanize the other side, incite
hatred, and only serve to perpetuate a culture of violence” (UNHRC, 2015). While the UNHRC
report and the ICC’s Preliminary Examination have exclusively referred to these actions as
having incited violence, they also contributed to a genocidal environment. The OSAPG (n.a)
identifies an increase in “inflammatory rhetoric or hate propaganda” among state leaders as
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setting a tone of impunity, which therefore creates circumstances that facilitate genocide. As
such, the statements made by Israeli and Palestinian officials leading up to the conflict may not
have only contributed to what the UNHRC (2015) refers as a ‘cultural of violence’, but also
intended to incite genocide among their respective populations. Therefore, this analysis will look
at individual statements and actions made by leaders within both groups and determine whether
they constitute as genocide under international law.
1. Incitement to Commit Genocide by Hamas Officials
As the first official act of violence committed during this conflict began with the
kidnaping and murder of three Israeli teens by two Hamas affiliates, this analysis first examines
the statements made by Palestinian officials. While scholars like Blumenthal (2014), have largely
attributed the failed peace talks and prisoner exchange as having created a feeling of helplessness
among Palestinians which directly led to the kidnaping and murder of the Israeli teens on June
14, this cannot solely be understood as having contributed to the murder and kidnaping of the
three teens. Statements made by Palestinian leaders prior to the conflict largely contributed to
Palestinian hostilities and should be recognized as having directly incited violence against Israeli
people. This is apparent in the ICC Preliminary Examination Report (2016) which highlighted its
concern for the escalation of violence in Palestine, specifically concerning alleged instances in
which Palestinian political leaders incited violence against Israelis7. Although the ICC has yet to
identify any specific instances of concern, the State of Israel report (2015) and the UNHRC

7

While the ICC Preliminary Examination Report (2016) only expressed concern regarding alleged incitement of
violence by Palestinian officials and groups, this does not mean that Israeli officials did not commit similar actions.
This is likely a result of the ICC’s limited jurisdiction, which restricts the court from examining actions, which
occurred outside of the occupied Palestinian territory. As any statements made by Israeli officials, which may have
incited violence, occurred in Israel, these acts are outside of the court’s jurisdiction unless the state of Israel
officially accedes into the Rome Statute.

41

(2015) report identified specific instances in which statements by Hamas officials were
recognized as inciting violence against Israeli people.
The first instance of alleged incitement was published on Facebook by Hamas
spokesperson Hussan Badram on June 10, two days prior to the kidnapping and subsequent
murder of the three Israeli teens (State of Israel, 2014). The statement specifically called upon
Palestinian men living in the West bank to “fulfill their duty… by targeting the occupation
soldiers and its settlers” (The Tower, 2014). While this post does not explicitly call upon
Palestinian men to kill or injury Israelis, the targeting of the occupations soldiers and settlers can
reasonably be inferred as a call for violence. Badram’s violent and criminal intent is further
supported by an additional post made the same day, which stated:
“The occupation must pay a high price in the blood of its soldiers and settlers until it is
persuaded to solve the issue of prisoners on hunger strike. This is everyone’s task, on the
individual and organizational levels,” (The Tower, 2014).
Badram’s call for the blood of Israeli soldiers and settlers clearly intends to incite violence
against Israeli people. While the statement has clear political motivations, specifically
concerning the release of the promised Palestinian prisoners, as this statement provokes
indiscriminate violence against Israeli settlers solely based on their national identity; this
statement therefore incites genocide against Israelis. As the statement was published to his
Facebook page and therefore is visible for the public to see, this statement constitutes as public
act. Whether or not it constitutes as a ‘direct’ action under international law is relatively unclear,
as the relevant legal precedent regarding incitement only stipulates that the statement be “more
than a vague or indirect suggestion of incitement” (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 65). While the
words used do not overtly call for the killing of Israelis, ultimately the statement called for the
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‘targeting’ of Israeli people so that they may ‘pay a high price in blood.’ Due to Badram’s call
for blood, this statement constitutes as direct and public incitement to commit genocide. This
understanding of the statement as inciting genocide, is further supported by the fact that two days
following its publication two Palestinians did in fact ‘target’ the three Israeli teen settlers and
made them ‘pay a high price in blood’.
Following this call for genocidal violence and the subsequent kidnaping and murder of
the three teens, the State of Israel (2015) accused Hamas of waging a campaign of incitement, in
which Hamas officials posted similarly inflammatory statements, speeches, and videos to
Palestinian television channels and social media throughout the conflict. As a participant in the
conflict, Israel’s report is recognized as biased and therefore the alleged reports of incitement
were crosschecked and confirmed by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
catalogue. MEMRI (2014) identified a variety of statements, but those made by Hamas
spokesperson Fawzi Barhoum are of specific concern for this analysis. On July 30, 2014, in an
interview with the Lebanese Al-Quds TV channel Barhoum explicitly called upon all Arabs
living in Israel and the West Bank to carry out terror attacks against Israeli people (MEMRI,
2014). The following are excerpts taken from Barhoum’s interview:
Let me say, loud and clear, to our people in the West Bank: Don't you have cars? Don't
you have motorcycles? Don't you have knives? Don't you have clubs? Don't you have
bulldozers? Don't you have trucks? Anyone who has a knife, a club, a weapon, or a car,
yet does not use it to run over a Jew or a settler, and does not use it to kill dozens of
Zionists, does not belong to Palestine.

43

Palestine says loud and clear: Real men are those who avenge the blood of Gaza. Real
men are those who avenge the blood of the Gaza Strip. Real men will not sleep until they
have avenged the blood of Gaza. (MEMRI TV, 2014).
Unlike the previous statement given by Badram, this statement is explicitly clear in the call for
violence against Israelis. While the argument can be made that these comments intended to incite
political violence, and not genocide, any statement that incites violence against a specific set of
people due to their membership or perceived membership within a specific group, is inherently
genocidal. This specific statement is genocidal in its nature as it clearly intended to provoke a
physical attack against Israeli people solely on the basis of their identity as ‘Zionists’ and ‘Jews’.
As the statement was made during a televised interview and explicitly called for the killing of
Israelis, due to their membership in that group, Barhoum’s statement constitutes as direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.
The last instance of alleged incitement by Hamas occurred on July 9, 2014 and rather
than a social media post or televised video, the act of concern aired as a song on Al-Aqsa TV
(MERMI TV, 2014). Below are two excerpts from a song created by Hamas members which
aired on the Al-Aqsa TV:
Annihilate all the Zionists! Rock Israel's security! Strive to engage the Zionists in
combat. Burn their camps and their soldiers. Rock Israel's security, and expose it to
flames and volcanos. Strive to engage the Zionists in combat. Burn their camps and their
soldiers. Rock Israel's security, and expose it to flames and volcanos… Volcanos! Attack!
Carry out bombings! Shock them! Annihilate all the Zionists! Rock Israel's security!
Attack! Carry out bombings! Shock them! Annihilate all the Zionists!
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They cannot endure war. They turn out to be like cobwebs, when they encounter knights.
Rock Israel's security! Light furnaces in its heart. Raze it to the ground, exterminate the
cockroaches' nest, and banish all the Zionists. Attack! (MEMRI TV, 2014)
This song is arguably the strongest evidence that Hamas and its member’s provocative
statements were said with the intent of inciting acts of genocide, rather than violence. From a
legal perspective, the lyrics depicted above clearly intended to incite genocide as they call upon
Palestinians to murder and injure Israeli civilians based upon their perceived membership in that
group, specifically through bombings, stabbings, and arson. The lyrics in this song clearly depict
Hamas’ genocidal intent to destroy Israeli people in ‘whole or in part’. This intent to destroy
Israelis ‘in whole or in part’ is apparent in the phrases ‘annihilate all the Zionist’ and
‘exterminate the cockroaches’ nest’. The use of the words ‘annihilate’ and ‘exterminate’ ‘all
Zionists’ clearly illustrates Hamas’s intention to not only cause physical injury or death to part
Israel’s population, but the intent to destroy Israelis in whole or in part.
Beyond that of the legal analysis of incitement, this song provides further evidence of
Hamas’s intent to incite genocide as the lyrics in the song dehumanizes Israelis as “less than
human” and therefore easier to kill. While international law does not recognize dehumanization
as an indicatory component of genocide, genocide scholars recognize the integral component that
dehumanization plays in the overall genocide process8. Various scholars specifically regard
dehumanization as a considerable warning sign previewing the occurrence of a genocide

8

Gregory Stanton is best known for his interpretation of polarization as an integral process in the 10 stages of
genocide. According to him, “Dehumanization is when one group treats another group as second-class citizens”
(Stanton, 2013: 2) Within this stage, members of a group are often compared with “animals, parasites, insects or
diseases” in order to make them more easy to kill (Stanton, 2013: 2). Similarly, Helen Fein has also acknowledged
the role of dehumanization occurs when the ‘other groups’ is expelled from what she refers to as the “human
universe of moral obligation” (Fein, 1979).
Fein, H. Accounting for Genocide. New York, NY: The Free Press, 4.
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(Neilsen, 2015). This act of dehumanization, while not legally required or recognized under
international law as an act of genocide, is arguably an almost unavoidable step in the genocide
process in which one or both groups dehumanizes the other as fundamentally different and less
than human. There for this dehumanization and the explicit calls for violence against Israeli
citizens based on their religious-national identity constitutes as ‘direct and public incitement to
commit genocide’.
2. Incitement to Commit Genocide and Dehumanization by Israeli Officials
This dehumanization was also apparent within the public rhetoric of Israeli officials
following the abduction of the three youths. Like that of Hamas officials, statements and actions
made by Israeli political and religious figures leading up to the 2014 conflict have been widely
condemned by the international community as having incited violence and hatred against
Palestinians (UNHCR, 2015 and the Washington Institute, 2016). The UNHRC (2015)
specifically condemned the actions taken by Israeli political and religious figures as having
largely contributed to the rise in “extreme anti-Palestinian rhetoric” and hatred on social media.
While not a statement, but an action, the Israeli government has also befallen criticism by
scholars such as Blumenthal (2014) for the investigation into the missing teens, which is viewed
as having contributed to the rise in extreme anti-Palestinian rhetoric and having created a racially
charged atmosphere.
Specifically, Blumenthal accused Netanyahu and the Israeli police of purposefully
deceiving the public into believing the three boys were still alive despite evidence, which
indicated otherwise9. This is apparent in the fact that the Chief police investigator told the

9

Blumenthal (2014) cites the fact that despite the forensic evidence, blood, bullets, and DNA, which indicated that
the three teens had been murdered in the car almost immediately after their abduction; Netanyahu refrained from
telling the public this. Rather, Netanyahu and the chief police investigators led the public and the parents of the
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parents of the teens that the gunshots heard in recorded phone calls were blanks, despite the fact
that the available evidence indicated otherwise (Levi, 2014). This discrepancy and the IDF’s gag
order over the investigation, which concealed the facts of the case from journalists and the wider
public, supports Blumenthal’s theory that this investigation was intentionally prolonged in order
to increase tensions among the Israeli population (Horowitz, Roth and Weiss 2014). This
investigation lasted for twelve days, in which the State of Israel initiated an international social
media campaign called #BringBackOurBoys and Operation Brother’s Keeper10. The seemingly
prolonged investigation and these two campaigns further destabilized the situation and increased
hostilities among both Israeli and Palestinian people (Blumenthal, 2014). All of these actions,
according to Blumenthal, contributed to feelings of hostility, anger and a desire for violence or
‘blood lust’ that eventually exploded upon the discovery of the three boys in June 30.
Within hours of the news that the teens were killed mobs and call for violence on social
media erupted among the large majority of Israel’s society. Mobs of Israeli youths formed riots
throughout Israel and the West Bank, chanting “Death to Arabs” as they marched (Blumenthal,
2014). Spontaneous Facebook pages also developed immediately after the discovery of the
bodies, which called for vengeance and the alienation of Palestinian Arabs. Whether the
investigation was intentionally prolonged in order to create a genocidal atmosphere remains
unclear, but it must be noted that it took Israel nearly two weeks to find the teen’s bodies, which
were buried in a shallow grave only ten kilometers from where the initial kidnaping occurred,
despite the states’ advanced technologies (Blumenthal, 2014). Considering this and the

murdered teens into believing the teens were not dead and that the shots heard in one of the boys phones calls
was a blank.
10
According to Blumenthal (2014) #BringBackOurBoys was an international social media campaign, which sought to
publicize the kidnapping and increase sympathy from Western democracy’s and Jews abroad. Operation Brother’s
Keeper was a military campaign in which the IDF increased the number of arrests and house raids, in an attempt to
find the missing teens and discourage collaboration with Hamas.
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subsequent dehumanizing and provocative statements made by government and political
officials, there is reason to believe the investigation was purposefully prolonged to increase
racial hostilities between the two groups. This theory is supported by the fact that, immediately
following the discovery of these bodies various Israeli political and religious leaders made public
statements, which have been widely condemned as further aggravating the situation rather than
deescalating the calls for violence among the Israeli people. Specifically, three statements were
identified as inciting violence, and possibly genocide, against Palestinians.
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s public response to the discovery of the teen’s bodies
specifically sparked concern among the international community as inflammatory rhetoric. In
numerous public post made to twitter on June 30, 2014 Netanyahu referred to the perpetrators as
“human animals” and covertly called for violence against Palestinians (Blumenthal, 2014). The
five separate posts ultimately read as:
“PM at the Cabinet meeting: With heavy grief we found 3 bodies. All signs indicate they
are of our abducted youths Eyal, Gilad and Naftali. They were abducted & murdered in
cold blood by human animals. On behalf of the entire Jewish People, I would like to tell
the dear families- the mothers, fathers, grandmothers and grandfathers, and brothers and
sisters – we are deeply saddened, the entire nation weeps with you. Vengeance for the
blood of a small child, Satan has not yet created. Neither has vengeance for the blood of
3 pure youths who were on their> way home to their parents who will not see them
anymore. Hamas is responsible and Hamas will pay. May the memories of the 3 boys be
blessed.” (Blumenthal, 2014).
While the passage does not explicitly upon Israelis to commit a violent crime, the
dehumanization of the perpetrators as “human animals” and the call for “the blood of a small
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child, Satan has not yet created” deserve further analysis. Netanyahu’s reference to the
Palestinian perpetrators as ‘human animals’ should not only be understood as exclusively
dehumanizing the two perpetrators of the crime, but having rather indirectly referred to all
Palestinians living in the West Bank. As the government’s gag order on the investigation hid all
information regarding the accused perpetrators, except that they were Palestinian, this statement
dehumanized all Palestinians as ‘human animals’ rather than the two murderers.
The labeling of Palestinians as ‘human animals’ was not said with the sole intent of
equating the population to animals, but was also in reference to a well-known biblically-inspired
poem “On the Slaughter” which dramatized a terrible pogrom in 1903, which resulted in the
brutal murder of a large number of European Jews (Blumenthal. 2014). As this reference
ultimately equates the Palestinians to the Russians in 1903, this statement should be understood
as an attempt to further escalate racial hostilities between the two groups and incite genocidal
violence against Palestinians. While the phrase “the blood of a small child, Satan has not yet
created” was in reference to a poem, in the context of an already racially charged climate this
statement equated Palestinians to Satan and demonized Palestinian children as inherently evil
beings, compared to the ‘blood of the 3 pure youths’. While this statement is unlikely to equate
to incitement under international law, as the call for violence was not direct, that does not mean
Netanyahu’s statement was not inherently genocidal in its nature. Regardless of whether the
statement directly called upon Israelis to commit a violent act, the statement called for
Palestinian blood and served to further dehumanize and polarize the two groups as one being
‘innocent’ and the other ‘evil’.
Rabbi Noam Perel made a similar biblical reference. The secretary general of the Bnei
Akiva, the world’s largest Zionist youth movement, explicitly called for the revenge of an entire
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nation and transformation of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) into “an army of avengers” that
“will not stop at 300 Philistine foreskins,” (Kashti, 2014). This statement was in reference to the
biblical story of David who killed two hundred Philistine, comprising of people living in the five
city-states of Gaza, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Ekron, Garth, and brought their foreskins back as proof.
While the statement is not explicit in that it does not use the word ‘kill’ or ‘slaughter’, the
objective of the statement is clear in that it calls for the mass murder of more than three hundred
Palestinians. The seriousness of this statement is exemplified by the fact that the Zionist youth
movement itself has condemned by Rabbi Perel for this statement, as numerous branches of the
organization in 2014 threatened to cut ties if the Rabbi was not removed (Maltz, 2014). Although
the statement is not ‘direct’ in the sense that it does not directly refer to Palestinians, in the
context it is clear that he is referring to Palestinians as a whole. He directly called upon Israelis,
or what he refers to as an ‘army of avengers’, to kill and seriously maim over three hundred
Palestinians clearly constitutes as direct and public incitement to commit genocide against the
Palestinian people. Ultimately, his inference that the killing ‘would not stop at 300 Philistine
foreskins,” is clear evidence for his call for the destruction of Palestinians in whole or in part.
Ayelet Shaked, who is an important and influential figure within the nationalistic-rightwinged Jewish Home Party, made a similar statement. Like that of Rabbi Perel, following the
discovery of the Israeli teens, Shaked posted a similarly inflammatory post to Facebook, which
has been regarded as having incited violence against Palestinians. While the post consisted of a
four-paragraph excerpt from an article written by Uri Elitzur,11 the first and last passages of her
post are of the most significant concern to this analysis. The two statements read as:

11

Uri Elitzur was a right-wing extremist and one of the leaders of the settler movement. He served as a
speechwriter and advisor to Netanyahu, and ultimately sought to colonize Palestinian land for further and
complete settlement.
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“The Palestinian people has declared war on us, and we must respond with war. Not an
operation, not a slow-moving one, not low-intensity, not controlled escalation, no
destruction of terror infrastructure, no targeted killings. Enough with the oblique
references. This is a war. Words have meanings. This is a war. It is not a war against
terror, and not a war against extremists, and not even a war against the Palestinian
Authority. These too are forms of avoiding reality. This is a war between two people.
Who is the enemy? The Palestinian people. Why? Ask them, they started.”
…
“Actors in the war are those who incite in mosques, who write the murderous curricula
for schools, who give shelter, who provide vehicles, and all those who honor and give
them their moral support. They are all enemy combatants, and their blood shall be on all
their heads. Now this also includes the mothers of the martyrs, who send them to hell with
flowers and kisses. They should follow their sons, nothing would be more just. They
should go, as should the physical homes in which they raised the snakes. Otherwise, more
little snakes will be raised there.” (cited in Norton, 2015).
Like that of Netanyahu and Rabbi Perel, Shaked’s statement clearly dehumanizes Palestinians as
inherently villainous and directly calls for the physical harm and destruction of Palestinians. This
dehumanization is apparent in the first passage, as she explicitly refers to the entirety of
Palestinians as “the enemy”. Furthermore, she specifically demonized civilians and Palestinian
mothers not involved in the combat, as “enemy combatants” in need of bloodshed.
Shaked’s statements not only dehumanized Palestinians as inherently an enemy to Israel,
her statements in the last passage of her post openly called for the physical and biological
destruction of the group as a whole, and should therefore be understood as direct and public
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incitement. This is apparent in her direct call for the death of ‘the martyrs’ and the physical
destruction of Palestinians homes so that no ‘more little snakes will be raised there.’ As her
statement explicitly calls for the physical death of all people and the destruction of Palestinian
homes in order to prevent future births of ‘little snakes’, there is no doubt that her intent was to
bring about the physical destruction of Palestinian people in whole or in part. While she
eventually deleted the post, it ultimately received over 1,000 likes and shares on Facebook before
it was deleted and has been regarded by the Russel Tribunal (2014) and Blumenthal (2014) as
inciting genocide and as having significantly fueled widespread anti-Palestinian rhetoric and
ultranationalist atmosphere that spurred the revenge killing of a Palestinian teen on July 2.
In conclusion, this analysis found that a variety of statements made by Palestinian and
Israeli officials significantly contributed to the escalation of violence, leading up to the 2014
conflict. Due to the dehumanizing nature of these statements, the public forum in which they
were published, and their explicit calls for violence against individuals on the basis of their
membership in the ‘other group’, these acts were ultimately recognized as direct and public
incitement to commit genocide and therefore violate article 3 (c) of the UNGC. While
dehumanization in itself is not legally recognized as a crime or act of genocide under
international law, the OSAPG and numerous genocide scholars recognize the momentous role
that dehumanization plays within the process of genocide. Due to the identified instances in
which Palestinian and Israeli officials attempted to incite genocidal violence and the systematic
use of dehumanizing rhetoric, the context in which the conflict developed and society as a whole
is inherently genocidal. As such, this next chapter will examine alleged acts taken by Israeli and
Palestinian actors during the conflict, and possible violations of article 2(a) of the UNGC.
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Chapter 5: Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group
The last chapter examined a variety of statements made by Israeli and Palestinian
officials proceeding the official military conflict, in order to determine whether these statements
violated of article 3 (c) of the Genocide Convention (UNGC, 1948, 2). In turn, statements made
by numerous Hamas officials and Israeli political and religious figures were recognized as
having significantly contributed to the escalation of violence leading up to the 2014 conflict.
This analysis understood these statements as legally constituting direct incitement to commit
genocide, due to the dehumanizing quality of the statements and their calls for violence against
their respective ‘other group.’ As evidenced by these instances of incitement and
dehumanization, it is likely that the conflict was genocidal as well. This next chapter will
therefore examine whether the actions taken by Palestinian and Israeli actors during the 2014
conflict violated article 2 (a) and (b) of the UNGC (1948), which prohibits “killing members of
the group” and “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” (UNGC, 1948,
article 2 (a) and (b)). This analysis will specifically examine the actions taken by numerous
Palestinian groups, primarily Hamas, and the IDF, as possible acts of genocide that intended to
kill or cause serious mental and bodily harm to members of their ‘other group’.
International law and global politics continues to place considerable emphasis on the
presence of physical death and injury when determining whether genocide occurred, despite the
fact that various scholars recognize that genocide more often than not results in the social death
of a group, rather than the physical death. This overemphasis is largely due to the fact that
physical death and injury is the most visible and prosecutable act of genocide. Unlike the legal
definition of war, which stipulates that at least 1,000 deaths occur in order to constitute as a war
under international law, the UNGC does not require a specific number of deaths or injuries to
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have occurred in order to constitute as genocide (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Despite this lack of
an explicit numerical requirement, the UNGC stipulates that in order to constitute as a genocidal
act, the act must have been committed with the intent to destroy a group ‘in whole or in part’
(UNGC, 1948). According to the legal precedent established in the ICTR, in order to be found as
intending to destroy a group ‘in whole or in part’, the act in question must have been directed
against a “substantial number of individuals in the group” (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 62). As
the number of individuals injured or killed during the conflict is relatively substantial, there is
reason to believe the actions taken by Palestinian armed groups and the IDF were committed
with the intent of killing or causing serious mental and bodily harm to individuals of their
respective ‘other group.’
During the seven-week conflict, approximately 2,251 Palestinians and 71 Israelis were
killed, and an additional 11,231 Palestinians and 1,600 Israelis were injured (World Report 2014,
2015). Of those killed, the United Nations has confirmed that 1,500 Palestinians and five Israelis
were civilians. While it is unclear as to the exact number of civilians injured during the conflict,
the OCHA (2015) has confirmed that the majority of those individuals injured on either sides of
the conflict were innocent civilians. While death and injury is an inherent cost of war, the
international community has largely criticized the military actions taken by Hamas, various
Palestinian armed groups, and the IDF, as having intentionally targeted protected civilians
(UNHRC, 2015). Although the targeting of civilians is not a genocidal act in itself, the
intentional killing or injuring of civilians solely based on their national or religious identity is. As
such, the military actions taken by Hamas and the IDF will be examined as having deliberately
targeted innocent civilians with the intent of killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of their respective ‘other group’ in order to destroy them ‘whole or in part.’
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1. Did Hamas and other Palestinian Armed Groups Kill or Cause Serious Bodily
Harm to Israeli People?
Like that of the previous chapter, this analysis will first examine acts committed by
numerous Palestinian armed groups since they were the first to launch an aerial attack against
Israel. As the number of Israelis killed or injured is more apparent than those who suffered
serious mental harms, this section will first examine actions taken by Palestinian armed groups
that killed or caused serious bodily harm to Israeli people in order to determine whether they
were committed with the intent of destroying Israeli-Jews in whole or in part. The next section
will then examine whether the actions taken by Palestinian armed groups intended to cause
serious mental harm to Israeli-Jews.
According to the UNHRC (2015), throughout the conflict the combined forces of Hamas
and various other Palestinian armed groups fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel,
which ultimately killed 71 Israelis and injured another 1,600 (UNHRC, 2015). Of the total
number of Israelis killed and injured, the UNHRC found that five civilians were killed and
approximately 1,600 Israeli civilians, including 270 children, were injured because of these
combined attacks. Of those individuals wounded, the report found that “36 people [were]
wounded by shrapnel, 33 people [were] hurt by shattered glass or building debris, and 159
people [were] injured in the rush to reach shelters” (UNHRC, 2015, 19).
The UNHRC (2015), Amnesty International (2015), and Human Rights Watch (2014)
have all publically criticized and condemned the attacks made against Israel, due to the
indiscriminate nature of the weapons used and the seemingly purposeful targeting of Israeli
citizens or populated areas. The international community considers the use of these specific
rockets and mortars, which are largely manmade, as inherently indiscriminate weapons because
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they do not possess precise targeting systems and are therefore by their nature unable to
distinguish between civilian and military combatants (Amnesty International, 2014). While the
mortars used during the conflict lack precise targeting capabilities and have a relatively short
firing range, when they are launched high into the air space above densely populated areas of
Israel they are both deadly and destructive (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The rockets used by
Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups function in a similar manner, but have a
comparatively further firing range between 20km to 80km and therefore are capable of reaching
further within Israel (Amnesty International, 2014). Although the use of rockets and mortars by
Palestinian forces clearly violates the principle of distinction under international law, their use of
inherently indiscriminate weapons does not necessarily constitute a genocidal act. The exclusive
use of these indiscriminate weapons is largely evidence of the limited resources and military
capabilities of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, rather than their intent to
destroy Israeli citizens.
The choice to target these indiscriminate weapons against densely populated civilian
areas, on the other hand, may constitute as an act of genocide intended to kill or cause serious
bodily harm to Israeli citizens. Evidence collected by the UNHRC (2015) and Human Rights
Watch (2014) largely supports this claim, found that Hamas and affiliated Palestinian armed
groups deliberately fired the majority of their rockets and mortar attacks were towards densely
populated civilian areas of Israel and known Kibitzes. While some Palestinian armed groups
explicitly declared their intent to only target military objectives 12 during the conflict, statements
made by Hamas officials and the Qassam Brigade13 on social media explicitly professed that

12

Amnesty International (2014) identified that Hamas appeared to have aimed some mortars at legitimate military
objectives. Mortars have a shorter range (of 3km to 10km) than rockets, but are still an imprecise weapon and
must therefore never be used to target military objectives located amidst civilians or civilian object
13
The Qassam Birgade is currently the largest military faction of Hamas (UNHRC, 2015).
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these attacks were intended to target not only civilian populated areas, but Israeli citizens
themselves (UNHRC, 2015, The Cyber and Jihad Lab, 2014, and Human Rights Watch, 2015).
Hamas spokesperson Fawzi Barhoum explicitly confirmed the intentional targeting of civilians
when he said in an interview on Al-Aqsa TV on July 11, that:
“The missiles of Al-Qassam will not hit any Arab home. Rest assured, our missiles
accurately target the homes of the Israelis and the Zionists.” (MEMRI, 2014).
While these rocket and mortar attacks are largely incapable of directly targeting Israeli homes,
due to their inherently indiscriminate nature, this statement makes it clear that these attacks were
intended for and directed against Israeli civilians and civilian areas. As the UNHRC (2014)
identified a significant amount of coordination between Hamas and other Palestinian armed
groups throughout the 2014 conflict, all attacks directed towards civilian areas should be
understood as having been coordinated with Hamas officials. Therefore, this analysis recognizes
all rocket and mortar attacks as having intentionally targeted Israeli civilians, unless a group
made an explicit advance 14 warning prior to an attack on a civilian area in Israel.
While the international community has exclusively referred to the use of indiscriminate
weapons and the direct targeting of Israeli citizens by Hamas, and other Palestinian armed
groups, as amounting to war crimes or crimes against humanity, these attacks may also constitute
as acts of genocide intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to Israelis citizens. As these
attacks directly targeted Israeli-Jews and not just Israeli citizens, the attacks were inherently
genocidal by their nature. This intentional targeting of Israeli-Jews solely on the basis of their
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The UNHRC (2015) reported a number of instances in which Palestinian attacks against civilian populated areas,
such as airport, were accompanied with sufficient warning. Due to their relative success in limiting the number of
lives lost, instances when these early warnings were given should not be ignored.
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national and religious identity, is apparent in a statement made by Barhoum during the 2014 war,
which proclaimed to Israeli Arabs living in cities such as Haifa, Jaffa, and Lod that:
“The rockets fired by the Al-Qassam Brigades will not hit you. We know those parts. We
are familiar with the geography and with the history. Not a single Arab Palestinian child
will be hit by one of our missiles. Our rockets are aimed at the Hebrews, the murderers,
the Israelis, the criminals.” (MEMRI, 2014).
This statement confirms the genocidal intent behind all attacks perpetrated by or coordinated
with Hamas. This is apparent as Barhoum’s statement explicitly declares that Hamas, and any
attacks affiliated with Hamas, not only targeted Israeli citizens, but rather purposefully targeted
Israeli citizens on the basis of their religious and national identity as ‘Israeli-Jews,’ over those
Arab-Israelis or Christian-Israelis. While Barhoum does not explicitly state that these actions
were intended to destroy Israelis’ in whole or in part,’ the genocidal intent is clearly evident
within Hamas’ founding charter, which declares that the organization’s main political objective
is to develop a sovereign state of Palestine and destroy Israel in the name of Islam (Hamas
Covenant, 1988). Specifically, Hamas’ Covenant states that:
“Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it
obliterated others before it" (The Martyr, Imam Hassan al-Banna, of blessed memory)”
(Hamas Covenant, 1988, 1).
As this document explicitly states Hamas’ intent to ‘obliterate’ Israel, all military attacks made
by, or coordinated with Hamas, should be recognized as intending to kill or cause serious bodily
harm to Israeli citizens with the intent of destroying Israeli-Jews in ‘whole or in part.’
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While these attacks intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to Israeli-Jews, due to
Israel’s Iron Dome these attacks were relatively unsuccessful in killing Israeli-Jews. As these
attacks clearly intended to kill Israeli citizens based on their group membership, and likely to
have been successful had Israel not possessed such an advanced missile defense system. These
acts therefore should be understood as attempted genocidal killings, which violates article 2 (a)
of the UNGC. In regards to those 1,600 Israelis injured as a result of these attacks, while it is
clear that a relatively substantial number of Israeli citizens were injured, due Israel’s limited
cooperation with the UNHRC investigation, the severity of these injuries is relatively unknown
(UNHRC, 2015). As the legal precedent regarding serious bodily harm requires that injuries
result in “serious acts of physical violence falling short of killing that serious injure the health,
cause disfigurement, or cause any serious injury to the external or internal organs or senses,” in
order to constitute as a legal violation, the severity of the injuries must be known (Human Rights
Watch, 2010, 53). While this analysis cannot say for sure whether the bodily harm suffered by
Israelis is sufficient, enough to constitute as a ‘serious bodily harm,’ due to the type of attacks it
is reasonable to assume a significant portion of injuries amounted to ‘serious harms.’ This can be
assumed from the fact that, the majority of Israelis were injured because of “flying shrapnel,
shattered glass, building debris and in the rush to seek protection during an attack,” which likely
caused more than minor injuries (UNHRC, 2014).
Two specific instances identified by the UNHRC (2015) support this claim that rocket
attacks caused serious bodily harm. In one instance, an Israeli citizen Jeham Breman was
seriously injured visiting his three-year-old son’s kindergarten class when a mortar exploded and
the “debris fractured [his] scapula, which destroyed the cartilage on his hand, and punctured his
lung” (UNHRC, 2015, 24). While he survived, his movement are “extremely limited” and at the
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time of his statement, he was still attending physiotherapy sessions (UNHRC, 2014: 24). In a
second attack, Gad Yarkoni’s legs suffered severe damage and were later amputated due to a
mortar attack on a Jewish Kibbutz in Nirim Israel (UNHRC, 2015: 23). Considering the severity
of the physical damage inflicted on these two individuals by Palestinian mortar and rocket
attacks, it is likely that a significant proportion of the 1,600 Israelis injured sustained injuries of
this magnitude. Until further information is released regarding the severity of the injuries
sustained by Israeli individuals, legally these attacks would not be recognized as acts of genocide
under international. Due to the likely seriousness of the injuries, this analysis recognizes the
attacks made by Hamas and Palestinian armed groups as intending to cause serious bodily harm
with the intent of destroying Israel in whole or in part.
2. Did Hamas and other Palestinian Armed Groups Cause Serious Mental Harm to
Israeli People?
Unlike physical death and injury, mental harm is generally covert and not always
physically visible. Therefore, it is significantly more difficult to document than those physical
injuries sustained to an individual. While there is no explicit statistic regarding the number of
Israelis who suffered mental harm as a result of the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, the UNHRC
(2015), the State of Israel (2015) and Amnesty International (2015) all identified a significant
increase in the number of Israeli civilians suffering from mental health problems as a result of
these attacks. According to the State of Israel (2015), mental health organizations throughout the
state identified tens of thousands requests made by Israeli civilians for medical assistance
concerning their mental health status. The Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Council in Israel, not
affiliated with the state of Israeli, reported to Amnesty International (2014) a similar rise in the
number of Israeli citizens who required mental health services. According to reports, the large
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majority of the mental health trauma identified was primarily instances of severe anxiety and
PTSD because of the rocket and mortar attacks, as well as the discovery of Palestinian tunnels
connecting the Gaza Strip to Israeli territory. Like that of the physical harm caused as a result of
Hamas and Palestinian armed groups attacks on Israel, this increase in psychological trauma and
mental health support among Israeli citizens must also be analyzed as a possible violation of
article 2(b) of the UNGC (1948).
In order to determine whether the actions taken by Hamas and other Palestinian armed
groups intended to cause serious mental harm among Israelis, the two specific causes for the rise
in mental health problems must be examined. In regards to the creation of Palestinian tunnels,
the UNHRC (2015) identified a significant number of Israeli citizens who associated their
increased anxiety because of the discovery of Palestinian tunnels having infiltrated Israeli cities
and settlements in the West Bank. While Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the
creation of tunnels were primarily created in order to “carry out attacks against civilians,”
(UNHRC, 2015, 62). The UNHRC (2015) did not find any specific evidence supporting this
claim; the report recognized that Hamas created these tunnels for military and civilian purposes.
Despite numerous cases in which the knowledge of the tunnels resulted in ‘severe stress,’ among
Israelis, as these tunnels had both military and civilian functions it is unlikely that they were
created with the intent of causing serious mental harm to Israeli citizens (Amnesty International,
2014).
Concerning Palestinian rocket and mortar attacks, the majority of the identified mental
health problems among Israeli citizens were cited as correlating with these attacks. While there is
no explicit policy or public statement by Hamas or any other Palestinian armed groups indicating
their intent to cause serious mental harm against Israelis, there is reason to believe these attacks
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intended to do just that. As the UNHRC (2015) recognized that Palestinian rocket and mortar
attacks are relatively incapable of gaining any substantial military advantage over Israel, due to
the inability of these attacks to be accurately directed at any given military target. The report
subsequently inferred that the launching of rockets and mortars into Israel by Hamas and other
Palestinian armed groups is done with the “primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the
civilian population” (UNHRC, 2014, 29). Furthermore, as the US State Department (2017) has
recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization since 1997, it is reasonable to assume that these acts
intended to spread terror among the Israeli population. This theory is further supported by the
fact that Hamas and various other Palestinian armed groups had been launching attacks against
Israeli citizens for weeks leading up to the official military conflict. The organizations historical
use of suicide bombers also suggests that the attacks made during the conflict were not directed
at military targets but rather intended to not only kill and physically harm Israelis, but to inflict
serious mental harm against the civilian population as a whole.
Although the definition of terrorism is widely contested under international law and
among scholars, terrorism is largely understood as “violence… or the threat of violence–used
and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” which is generally “directed against
noncombatants and designed to instill fear in an audience” (Hoffman, 2006, 3 and Viotti &
Kauppi, 2013, 256). As a result of these acts of terror, individuals and societies effected often
suffer from serious psychological problems. Numerous individuals are known to become
physically ill because of this constant fear and anxiety. In the case of Israel, ongoing and
unpredictable mortar and rocket attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have
resulted in significant psychological problems among the population (State of Israel, 2015).
These attacks specifically caused constant fear and anxiety, and in extreme cases deliberating
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anxiety attacks among Israeli citizens (UNHRC, 2015 and State of Israel, 2015). A number of
cases have also been identified in which Israeli citizen’s anxiety manifested into physical side
effects such as, “heart palpitations, muscle weakness and tension, fatigue, nausea, chest pain,
shortness of breath, stomach aches, or headaches” (State of Israel, 2015, 126). Although the
UNHRC and other international organizations were unable to access information from within
Israel, the report heighted a specific instance of severe mental harm (2015). This report identified
a case in which a young women developed such constant and severe anxiety as a result of the
rocket and mortar attacks, eventually she developed “epileptic like seizures whenever she heard a
rocket or sounds associated with the attacks” (UNGA, 2015, 148).
Despite a lack of explicit intent to inflict serious mental harm against Israeli citizens, it
can be assumed that Hamas intended to cause such harms. This is inferred from the Hamas
Covenant (1988) and from the fact that the psychological effects associated with such terror
attacks is known to cause serious psychological trauma. Therefore, these rocket and mortar
attacks should be understood as having been committed with the intent of destroying Israelis ‘in
whole or in part.’ While this analysis recognizes these attacks as acts of genocide intended to
cause ‘serious mental harm,’ these acts are likely not to be recognized under international law as
causing “grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and
constructive life” due to a lack of specific intent and individual cases resulting in serious mental
harm. Despite this, it is necessary to recognize the detrimental effect that these terror attacks
have had on Israelis and Israel’s society as a whole15. This constant fear and anxiety of a terrorist
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As a result of the constant fear of terrorist attacks, in the form of rocket, mortar, or suicide bombings, Israeli
citizens have suffered from a significant loss of personal freedom and as a result of PTSD, individuals may
intentionally restrict their involvement with people or situations in fear of encountering or being reminded of
terror related violence (Hoffman, B. (2006). Specifically, the constant fear of a terrorist attack has been recognized
as restricting the ability of individuals to engage in their society and culture.
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attack restricts the ability of individuals to engage in their society and community. While social
death and the destruction of a culture is not recognized as an act of genocide under international
law, it is important to understand the impact these actions have had on the society as a whole.
3. Did the IDF Kill or Cause Serious Bodily Harm to Palestinians Living in Gaza?
Unlike that of Hamas, Israel’s constitution and legislative policies, do not explicitly
declare the state’s genocidal intent to destroy Palestinian as a group. Despite this lack of explicit
intent, there is reason to believe the actions taken by the IDF during the 2014 Israel-Gaza War
were intended to kill or cause serious harm to Palestinians living in Gaza with the intent of
destroying Palestinians ‘in whole or part.’ The disproportionate use of force and seemingly
excessive number of Palestinians either killed or physically injured during the conflict supports
this theory. The UNHRC (2014) found that as a result of Israel’s air strikes and ground
operations in the Gaza Strip, approximately 2,251 Palestinians were killed and another 11,231
Palestinians were injured as a result of the fifty-day long conflict, the majority of which has been
identified as innocent civilians. While international reports and investigations reported relatively
little on specific instances in which Palestinians were injured, these reports identified that 10
percent of the injuries suffered by civilians were permanent (UNHRC, 201). While the
international community has largely condemned Israel’s actions as having violated the principles
of distinction, precaution and proportionality, they have not examined the IDF’s actions as
possible acts of genocide. Due to the previously identified instances of incitement and
dehumanization among Israeli officials, there is reason to believe the IDF’s actions violated
article 2 (a) and (b) of the UNGC (1948). This section of the analysis will specifically examine
alleged instances in the IDF targeted civilians and civilian protected areas, used indiscriminate
weapons, and the implemented the Hannibal directive in Rafah.
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According to the UNHRC (2015), during the 2014 Israel-Gaza War the IDF launched
more than 6,000 aerial attacks against Gaza. Investigations and reports by the UNHRC (2015),
the Human Rights Watch (2014), and Amnesty International (2014) all identified that a
significant number of these attacks seemingly deliberately directed against civilian populated and
protected areas. While these reports all identified instances in which the IDF protected shelters,
ambulances, and medical personal allegedly targeted, this analysis will focus primarily on the
IDF’s direct targeting of residential homes and buildings as a genocidal attack due to the scale
and systematic nature of these attacks. As such, it is necessary to recognize that the IDF’s direct
targeting of UNWRA shelters, ambulances and medical personal resulted in a substantial number
of Palestinian deaths and injuries. Specifically, in the three identified attacks against protected
shelters, the UNHRC (2015) reported that approximately 47 Palestinians were killed and at least
another 200 were injured because of these attacks. In regards to alleged attacks against
ambulances and recognized medical personnel, the UNHRC identified at least 24 instances in
which the IDF targeted ambulances and medical personnel. These attacks killed 23 medical
personal and injured another 83 Palestinians.
Of most concern to the international community has been the IDF’s deliberate targeting
of residential homes and buildings throughout the Gaza Strip. Despite the fact that the UNHRC
(2015) was unable to identify the exact number of direct attacks made against residential homes,
the report specifically found that over 142 Palestinian families were targeted and somewhere
between 742 to 1066 Palestinians were found to have died in their homes because of attacks on
residential complexes. While the exact number of Palestinians injured during these attacks is
unknown, it is reasonable to assume that the number is relatively high due to the disproportionate
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number of women and children injured 16 during the entire conflict. Israel and the IDF have
defended their direct attacks against residential homes as legitimate military objectives, due to
the ‘alleged’ presence of Hamas members or use of these homes to store weapons. While the
UNHRC (2015) and Amnesty International (2014) have expressed their concern regarding these
allegations and condemned Hamas for endangering civilian lives, ultimately the two reports
understand the IDF’s attacks as illegal. Under international law even in cases in which suspected
military targets are present, military actors have an obligation to refrain from attacking civilian
areas, especially in cases in which the possible civilian causalities or injures are clearly
disproportionate when compared to the feasible military gain.
As such, all attacks against residential buildings are illegal under international law,
regardless of whether or not the UNHRC identified a legitimate military objective. While the
UNHRC (2015) confirmed that out of the 15 cases examined, only nine of the IDF’s direct
targeting of residential homes possessed evidence of a possible military objective. In the other
six cases, the report specifically identifies a complete lack of evidence to explain the purposeful
targeting of these homes and civilians. These six identified cases and any other case that the IDF
may have directly targeted despite any evidence of a legitimate military target, should be
understood as having intended to kill or cause serious harm to Palestinians. While it is illegal
under international law and arguably genocidal to target any residential buildings, as this
indicates a complete lack of regard or “callous indifference” for the lives of innocent Palestinians
(UNHRC, 2014, 72). The intentional targeting of residential homes without the presence of a
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As a significant number of women and children were injured during the overall conflict, it is likely that these
injuries occurred as a result of the IDF’s attacks against residential homes and areas. This can be inferred, because
the UNHRC (2015) report expressed concern for the disproportionate effect that these residential attacks had on
women and children, who were largely restricted from leaving their homes throughout the conflict.
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military target indicates that the IDF’s attacks largely intended to cause wide scale causalities
and physical injuries among Palestinians people, rather than obtain a military advantage over
Palestinian forces (Amnesty International, 2014).
The IDF’s intent to cause wide scale death and injury is apparent due to the calculated
timing of the attacks. The UNHRC (2015) identified that nearly all attacks made against
residential homes were conducted in the evening or dawn hours, specifically during iftar or
shhur in which Muslim Palestinians families were gathered for their Ramadan meals (UNHRC,
2015). The timing of these attacks designates the IDF’s intent to not only attack military
objectives, but more clearly to ensure that whole families would be home during the attack and
therefore cause significantly more causalities and injuries. While the IDF said that it made all
attempts to limit civilian causalities, the UNHRC report concluded that
“a reasonable commander must have been aware that such an attack was likely to result
in a high number of civilian casualties as well as in considerable destruction,” (UNHRC,
2015, 60).
Therefore, these attacks likely were intentional and deliberate attacks intended to kill or cause
serious bodily harm to Palestinians.
This purposeful targeting of civilian homes may indicate that the IDF was operating
under a genocidal policy. The UNHC (2015) says as much, in its assessment of the IDF’s
massive and destructive attacks on residential homes. The report specifically raises its concern
that:
“these strikes may have constituted military tactics reflective of a broader policy,
approved at least tacitly by decision-makers at the highest levels of the Government of
Israel” (UNHRC, 2015, 66).
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Considering the previously identified instances of genocidal incitement and use of dehumanizing
rhetoric against Palestinians by Israeli governmental officials, such as Prime Minister
Netanyahu, these attacks should be understood as having intentionally targeted Gaza citizens
solely based on their identity as Palestinians. Further investigation into this alleged broader
policy is necessary in order to determine if the existence of such a policy. Despite this, these
attacks should therefore be understood as having killed and caused serious bodily harm against
Gaza residents with the intent of destroying Palestinians ‘in whole or in part.’ While the intent of
these acts is not explicitly stated, ultimately the intent is inferred from the systematic targeting of
these residential buildings despite the clearly devastating effect it was having on protected
civilians.
Of additional concern has been the choice of weapons and the use of force by the IDF
during the aforementioned airstrikes and its overall military operation in Gaza. The UNHRC
(2015), Amnesty International (2014), and Human Rights Watch (2015) have largely referred to
the IDF’s use of artillery, mortars and other explosive devises in the heavily populated areas as
constituting as indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against Palestinian people. While the
State of Israel (2015) has said that the IDF utilized munitions, that wold minimize civilian
causalities and injuries, the evidence indicates otherwise. Specifically, the IDF’s use of mortars,
tank shells, and other highly explosive weapons has been recognized by the UNHRC (2015) and
the NGO Action on Armed Violence (2014) as indiscriminate and deadly in the context of Gaza.
This is due to the wide area effect of these weapons, which is detrimental and therefore
prohibited in the densely civilian populated areas like the Gaza Strip. Due to the wide range and
scale of the destruction associated with these weapons, even in instances in which the IDF
directly targeted a specific military objective, such attacks killed and injured a significant
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number of innocent civilians because of the damage associated with these attacks (UNHRC,
2015).
The UNHRC (2015) and Amnesty International (2015) heighted two specific weapons as
having had a significantly detrimental effect on Palestinian civilians. The first being the IDF’s
use of an explosive weapon known as GBU-31/MK, which was found to have been used in
several attacks against residential buildings. According to engineers and weapons designers, the
GBU-31 has an extremely wide impact range and concussive effect. The physical damage of
such weapons is known to “rapture lungs, burst sinus cavities, and tear off limbs hundreds of feet
from the blast site,” (UNGA FULL, 2014, 62). According to trauma physicians, the death and
injury to those individuals near such an attack “would be pretty nasty” (San Diego Union
Tribune, 2003). The international community expressed similar concerns in regards to the IDF’s
use of flechettes throughout the military conflict. According to Amnesty International (2014)
flechettes are small, sharply pointed steel darts steel darts, which are approximately 3.5cm-long.
When used around 5,000 to 8,000 flechettes are packed into artillery shells and when fired into
the air, these darts cover “an area about 300m by 100m” (Amnesty International, 2014). Due to
their wide range and the physical damage that flechettes are capable of inflicting, this weapon is
intended solely for mass infantry attacks against other military troops. Therefore, when used in
such a densely populated area as Gaza, the use of flechettes “pose a very high risk to civilians”.17
While these weapons are not inherently illegal under international law, their use in the context of
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While there is relatively limited information concerning the use of flechettes in the 2014 Israel-Gaza War, the
State of Israel (2015) has confirmed their use in the conflict. Numerous reports have identified a specific instance
during the conflict in which case of Nahla Khalil Najjar, who has been identified as having suffered serious injuries
to her face and chest as a result of the IDF’s use of flechette shells in the village of Khuzaa on July 17th (Withnall,
2014).
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Gaza has been understood, by Amnesty International (2014), B’Tselem (2011), and Human
Rights Watch (2003), as indiscriminate and possibly amounting to war crimes.
Considering the known damage these weapons inflict upon civilians and the international
community’s recognition of Israel’s use of similar weapons in previous conflict as
indiscriminate, the IDF’s choice to use such weapons is inherently genocidal. Unlike that of
Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, which used indiscriminate weapons because they are
the only available weapons, the IDF is in possession of weapons which are more suited for
civilian combat and that are more capable of accurate precision targeting. Despite this, the IDF
intentionally choose to use weapons with a wide scale effects and that have been recognized by
the international community as extremely dangerous to civilians in the context of the Gaza
conflict. The UNHRC (2015) recognized that the IDF’s choice of artillery weapons was
intentional and utilized despite the knowledge of the effect such an attack would have on
civilians. Specifically, the report stated:
“when choosing a weapon with a wide-area effect like artillery to strike a target located
in a densely populated area… the IDF must have been aware that there was a strong
likelihood that military objectives and civilian objects alike would be struck” (UNHRC,
2015, 116).
As the international community understands that, the IDF purposefully chose to use, and
continued using these weapons despite the well-documented effect they were having on
Palestinian civilians. The IDF’s choice to use these weapons should be recognized as having
intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to Gaza citizens with the intent of destroying
Palestinians ‘in whole or in part’. As the UN and the precedent set within the ICTR recognizes
that genocidal intent can be inferred from the “intensity and scale of acts… types of weapons
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employed (in particular weapons prohibited under international law),” Israel’s choice of weapons
and excessive use of these weapons acts as evidence of the IDF’s genocidal intent to destroy
Palestinians living Gaza ‘in whole or in part’ (OSAPG, n/a, and Human Rights Watch, 2010).
The devastating effect of the IDF’s choice of weapons and indiscriminate use of force
was most apparent on August 1st in Rafah, which has been recognized by Amnesty International
(2015) as “one of the deadliest Israeli attacks during the war” and has since been dubbed ‘Black
Friday’ by Gaza residents (Amnesty International, 2015, 6). As a result of Israel’s
implementation of the Hannibal directive in response to Hamas’ capture of an Israeli soldier,
somewhere between 135 to 200 Palestinians were killed and even more injured, the most of
whom were killed or injured in the first couple of hours of the four-day long attack. The
Hannibal Directive is only employed if an Israeli soldier is captured. Ultimately, the directive
allows any Israeli field commander to implement “active artillery fire and air force strikes”
around an area without permission from their base of operation (Amnesty International, 2015,
19). In the context of Rafah, the UNHRC (2015) specifically reported that during this one attack:
the IDF fired over 1000 shells against Rafah within three hours and dropped at least 40
bombs. Tanks and bulldozers demolished dozens of homes. Inhabitants came under
intense attacks in their homes and in the streets. (UNHRC, 2015, 91).
Essentially, the UNHRC (2015) found that during this attack, all people buildings and
vehicles in Rafah became a ‘military target’ (UNHRC, 2015). This is evident in the number of
civilians killed following the implementation of the directive.
This attack on Rafah and the Hannibal Directive in general have been widely condemned
by the international community. Specifically, the attack on Rafah and the Hannibal directive
clearly violate the principles of distinction and proportionality. The UNHRC (2015) and
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Amnesty International (2015) acknowledges that the IDF perpetrated its attack despite the
knowledge that such an attack would result in significant loss of civilian life. As such, the both
reports regarded the IDF’s actions in Gaza as feasibly amounting to war crimes. While the IDF’s
actions clearly constitute as violations of the principle of distinction and proportionality, the
implementation of the Hannibal directive in Rafah more clearly constitutes as genocide, rather
than war crimes. It is apparent that the Hannibal Directive as a military policy violates
international law and is a war crime in itself, but the implementation of the Hannibal Directive in
the context Rafah makes the directive genocidal. This is due to the context in which the directive
was implemented and the IDF’s purposeful targeting of innocent civilians specifically based on
their identity as Arab Palestinians, or enemies to Judaism (UNHRC, 2015).
While the UNHRC blames the ‘military culture’ and political policies as a significantly
contributing to the mindset of individual members of the IDF which allowed them to implement
such a deadly attack on Rafah, “in total disregard for its impact on the civilian population,”
(UNHRC, 2015, 96). This ‘military culture’ refers to the rise in not only national secularism, but
also a “rearmed Jewish messianism18” which actively reaffirms Israel’s need to defend the
Jewish religion from its enemies (Blumenthal, 2014, 20). As a result, it may be understood that a
significant number of Israeli-Jews in the military have successfully morphed Palestinian society
and its civilians, not just Hamas or members of other Palestinian armed groups, into an enemy
against Judaism.
As a result, the conflict between Israel and Palestine arguably morphed into one of a holy
war. This call for a holy war against Palestinians is most explicitly clear in the statements made
by the commander who implemented the Hannibal Directive, Colonel Ofer Winter, proceeding
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A messianism, refers to “a savior or liberator of the Jewish people” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017).
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the initial ground invasion into Gaza (Blumenthal, 2014). In a letter penned to his soldiers in the
Givati Brigade on July 17, 2014 Col. Winter not only reiterated the widespread religiousnationalist narrative among the Jewish army and called for a holy war against Gaza, in essence
he called for the mass murder of Palestinians living in Gaza. This is most apparent in two
specific excerpts from his letter, which stated:
History has chosen us to be the sharp edge of the bayonet of fighting the terrorist enemy
“from Gaza” which curses, defames and abuses the God of Israel’s battles.
…
We will do everything to live up to the mission and wipe out the enemy and remove the
threat from the Nation of Israel. Nobody here returns without performing.
…
We will act and do everything to return our lads safely. Using all means at our disposal
and with all required force. (Abunimah, 2014).
Winter’s letter not only frames the 2014 Israel-Gaza War as that of a holy war intended to defend
Judaism from the Palestinian threat, essentially he foreshadowed the actions that he and his
troops would implement in less than two weeks after the letter was published. This letter further
dehumanized the Palestinians in Gaza as threats to the Jewish religion and further enflamed
religious and racial differences perceived to exist between the IDF and the citizens of Gaza.
Considering this statement and those previously published by Israeli officials, the actions taken
by the Givati Brigade in Rafah should be understood as having deliberately killed and harmed
Gaza residents with the intent of destroying Palestinians in whole or in part.
Ultimately, the IDF’s purposeful targeting of residential homes, the use of indiscriminate
and disproportionate weapons, and the implementation of the Hannibal directive in Rafah should
all be understood as having intended to kill and cause serious bodily harm to Gaza residents. The
systematic manner and the sheer scale of the attacks utilized by the IDF is clear evidence of the
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IDF’s intent to destroy Palestinians in ‘whole or in part.’ Considering the sheer number of
Palestinians killed because of the overall conflict, the actions taken by the IDF violated article
2(a) of the UNGC. Although there is relatively little available information concerning specific
cases of injury and therefore the severity of the harm inflicted upon injured Palestinians, the
UNHRC (2015) recognized that out of the 11,310 injuries sustained during the conflict, ten
percent or 1,123 injuries resulted in permanent damage.19 While international law does not
stipulate that a ‘serious bodily harm’ amount to permanent damaged, this percentage illustrates
the severity of the bodily harm inflicted upon Palestinian civilians. Considering the sheer scale of
individuals injured and the number of injuries, which resulted in permanent damage, the IDF’s
actions likely intended to cause serious bodily harm and therefore violated article 2(b) of the
UNGC.
4. Did the IDF’s Actions Cause Serious Mental Harm to Palestinians in Gaza?
As with any military conflict, individuals effected by violence and destruction often do
not exclusively suffer physical harm, but emotional or mental harm as well. Therefore, it is no
surprise that the UNHRC (2015) and Doctors Without Borders (MSF) (2014) both identified a
significant increase in reported cases of mental trauma throughout Gaza during and following the
2014 Israel-Gaza War. The UNHRC (2014) specifically identified that 20 percent of Gaza’s
entire population, including approximately 373,000 children, require “long term mental health
assistance,” because of the most recent military conflict (UNHRC, 2015, 156). Considering this,
it is necessary to further examine the extent and severity of this trauma in order to determine
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The severity of the physical harm inflicted upon Palestinians is apparent in the fact that more than 100
amputations occurred as a result of the conflict (WHO, 2015).
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whether the IDF’s actions deliberately inflicted ‘serious mental harm’ on Gaza residents with the
intent of destroying Palestinians ‘in whole or in part’.
While MSF (2014) and the majority of other health organizations in Gaza focused
primarily on providing medical treatment to individuals who were physically harmed during the
conflict, a significant number of Palestinians also received mental health consultations or
treatment. Although there is no specific statistic regarding the number of Palestinians who sought
treatment for these issues, the number was clearly substantial as the Palestinian authority in Gaza
had to reinstate MSF’s mental health program in order to meet the needs following the 2014
conflict (MSF, 2014). Of those Palestinians who sought mental health consolations in Gaza, the
majority attributed their mental health issues to loss and trauma they suffered as a result of
military conflict (WHO, 2015, 12). As a result of this loss and trauma, the UNHRC (2015)
identified a “profound sense of hopelessness among” and significant increase in PTSD and
anxiety disorders among Gaza’s population 20(UNHRC, 2015, 156). The scale of this mental
trauma is apparent within the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, as the director of the
program identified that of the total number of children referred to the health center, at the time of
this report 50 percent of these children suffered from PTSD (Cohen and Pierce, 2015).
While there is relatively little information concerning the specific cases and severity of
these problems, like that of Israeli citizens, reports have identified a number of cases in which
Gaza citizens have been become physically ill and suicidal as a result of their anxiety and PTSD
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According to the WHO (2014) following an assessment on the mental health needs in Gaza, the number of
Palestinians with mental disorders as a result of the conflict is unknown, but “though the precise extent of current
mental disorders in Gaza is not known, meta-analysis of the most robust epidemiological surveys (those using
random samples and diagnostic interviews) in conflict-affected populations around the world show an average
prevalence of 15.4% (30 studies) for PTSD and of 17.3 % (26 studies) for depression”
http://www.emro.who.int/pse/palestine-
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(UNHRC, 2015 and UNRW, 2016). The physiological trauma inflicted on Palestinian children
has also resulted in serious physical symptoms as well. Specifically, the UNHRC (2015) and
WHO (2015) have identified numerous cases in which children and teenagers who suffered from
PTSD or anxiety have experienced increased aggression, violence, extreme night terrors, and
even urine retention problems or bed wetting as a result of their exposure to the conflict. While
further investigation is needed to identify a more precise understanding of the number and
severity of these cases, MSF (2014) has recognized that the majority of Palestinians who sought
mental health assistance experienced “psychological suffering which impedes their normal life”
(MSF, 2014: 70).
As the precedent set within the Akayesu judgement understands ‘serious mental harm’ as
having to have impacted a person’s “ability to lead a normal and constructive life,” those
Palestinians with severe PTSD and anxiety identified by MSF should be understood as having
suffered ‘serious mental harm’ (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 62). Whether or not the IDF’s
actions during the conflict intended to cause serious mental harm to Palestinians is unclear. As
the UNHRC (2015) recognized the IDF’s choice of weapons, excessive force, and targeting of
residential areas as having been conducted with the knowledge of the physical risk these acts
pose to civilians, it is reasonable to assume that the IDF was also aware of the psychological or
mental harm these attacks would have had on Palestinians living in Gaza. Despite this
knowledge, due to a general lack of information regarding individual cases of mental harm and
what specifically caused the trauma, it is unclear as to whether these acts were committed with
the specific intent of causing serious harm. Due to this lack of information, from a legal
perspective these attacks are unlikely to be recognized under international law as having
intended to cause mental harm and will likely be understood as a ‘relatively’ natural consequence
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of war. While the IDF’s actions may not legally constitute as having violated article 2 (b) of the
UNGC, it is important to recognize that the IDF’s military attacks were committed with a blatant
disregard to both the physical and psychological well-being of innocent Gaza civilians.
In conclusion, this analysis ultimately found that a variety of actions taken by Hamas and
the IDF throughout the seven-week long conflict violated articles 2 (a) and (b) of the UNGC.
Specifically, this analysis found that the direct targeting of rockets and mortars against IsraeliJews by Hamas, and those Palestinian armed groups coordinating with Hamas, intended to kill or
‘cause serious bodily or mental harm’ to Israeli-Jews with the intent of destroying Israelis in
whole or in part’. In regards to the IDF, the direct targeting of residential homes, intentional use
of indiscriminate weapons, and the implementation of the Hannibal Directive in Rafah were
recognized as genocidal acts intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to Palestinian residents
living in Gaza. While this analysis recognized the detrimental effect the conflict had on the
mental health of Gaza residents and the IDF’s clear disregard for such trauma, due to a lack of
information and intent, the IDF’s actions were not recognized as having intended to cause
serious mental harm to Palestinians in Gaza. As such, this next chapter will examine the IDF’s
actions as possible violations of article 2 (c) of the UNGC, which prohibits inflicting upon a
groups conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part.
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Chapter 6— Deliberately Inflicting Conditions of life Calculated to Bring about the
Physical Destruction of Palestinians in Gaza
The last chapter examined the actions taken by Hamas, various Palestinians armed
groups, and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) as possible violations of article 2 (a) and (b) of the
UNGC. Ultimately, the actions taken by these actors were recognized as having killed and
caused serious bodily harm to members of their respective ‘other group,’ with the intent of
destroying that group ‘in whole or in part’. While the last chapter examined both Palestinian and
Israeli actions as possible acts of genocide, this chapter will solely examine the actions taken by
the IDF and the State of Israel. Specifically, this chapter will determine whether the actions taken
by the IDF and State of Israel violated article 2 (c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention (UNGC),
which prohibits “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part” (UNGC, 1948). In order to understand Israel’s
actions during the 2014 Israel-Gaza War as having possibly intended to inflict conditions of life
calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians living Gaza, this analysis will
also examine the effects that the blockade have had on the Gaza strip since the war ended.
While the actions taken by various Palestinian armed groups were harmful and
destructive, this analysis choose to exclude these actions. Actions taken by Hamas and various
other Palestinian armed groups were excluded due to the limited military capabilities of
Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and their inability as the occupied group to exert control over
the Jewish state. As such, this analysis recognizes Palestinian armed groups as largely incapable
of inflicting conditions on Israel that would bring about its physical destruction. The next chapter
will examine this power dynamic in further detail, but as of now the recognized power
capabilities of Palestinian actors in comparison to those of the state of Israel’s provides
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reasonable evidence that Palestinian actors feasibly cannot inflict physically genocidal conditions
of life onto Israeli people. As the more powerful and occupying state, this analysis exclusively
recognizes Israel as having the ability to inflict on Gaza resident’s conditions of life calculated to
bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians in whole or in part.
As the last chapter exemplified, the IDF’s actions during the 2014 conflict resulted in
widespread and disproportionate loss of human life and injury among Palestinians living in Gaza.
Unfortunately, the war did not only result in wide scale death and injury. The IDF’s actions also
caused “massive destruction” to essential civilian infrastructure and services throughout all of
Gaza (Amnesty International, 2015). The IDF’s actions during the conflict have specifically
been recognized as having severely damaged or destroyed a variety of necessary civilian homes
and services like that of Gaza’s power plant, various water and sewage treatment facilities, and a
number of medical facilities in Gaza. The physical destruction of Gaza itself had a detrimental
effect on Palestinians living in Gaza during and after the conflict. As a result of Israel’s ongoing
air, sea and water blockade, this effect has been further aggravated.
The actions taken by the IDF during the conflict and those taken by the state of Israel
since its conclusion have been widely condemned by the international community as violating
international law. Due to the context in which the war began and the seemingly deliberate
targeting of Palestinian civilians by the IDF, there is reason to believe that these attacks
deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Gaza
residents, with the intent of destroying Palestinians in whole or in part. This analysis will
specifically examine how the IDF’s actions contributed to the serious housing, electricity, water,
and health situations in Gaza and determine whether or not these situations constitute as
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a group.
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1. The Housing Epidemic
The last chapter identified the IDF’s attacks against residential buildings as having been
committed with the intent of killing and causing serious bodily harm to Palestinians. While these
attacks killed and injured thousands of Palestinians, they also caused the complete destruction of
five percent of Gaza’s entire housing stock (OCHA, 2014). The UNHRC (2015) identified that
18,000 residential housing complexes in Gaza, including some UNRA Shelters, were destroyed
“in whole or in part” and an additional 80,000 Palestinian homes and properties required
significant rehabilitation following the conflict (UNHRC, 2015). Overall, the IDF’s attacks
damaged 142,071 housing units during the conflict (OCHA, 2014).
As a result of this damage 500,000 Palestinians, or roughly 29 percent of Gaza’s
population, were internally displaced during the height of the war (UNHRC, 2015). While the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
(UNRWA) provided shelter for Palestinians whose homes were destroyed, these facilities did not
necessarily offer adequate safety or security. This was largely a consequence of the
overcrowding of the shelters due to the sheer number of internally displaced individuals. Like
that of Palestinian homes, these shelters were also vulnerable to attack by the IDF because the
shelters allegedly housed military weapons or near alleged military objects. As a result, the
conflict continuously uprooted Palestinians from both their homes and from their temporary
shelters. As internally displaced individuals, Palestinians without homes were extremely
vulnerable to death, injury, and illness (The World Bank, 2015). Unlike other military conflicts,
such as the one in Syria, displaced persons are largely able to escape the violence and seek
protection outside of their countries as refugees; Palestinians displaced in the Gaza strip had
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nowhere to go to because of Israel’s unwavering control over Gaza’s borders. Therefore,
displaced Palestinians were subject to the harms of the conflict.
Even though the conflict officially ended in late August of 2014, a significant number of
Palestinians displaced during the conflict remain internally displaced within Gaza today.
According to UNRWA (2015), a year after the conflict, approximately 100,000 Palestinians
remained displaced and the majority of the homes destroyed or damaged during the war had yet
be reconstructed. While the number has declined slightly, Human Rights Watch (2016) found
that as of 2016 approximately 65,000 Palestinians continue to remain internally displaced within
Gaza because of the 2014 conflict. Amnesty International (2016) and the UNHRC (2015) found
that Israel’s ongoing blockade of Gaza largely contributes to this prolonged displacement and
delayed reconstruction.
Since Israel has complete control over what enters and exits the Gaza Strip, the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza has been largely unable to obtain necessary construction
materials or assistance in order to rebuild and repair the residential complexes damaged during
the conflict (UNHRC, 2015). While the UN created the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM)
in order to facilitate cooperation between the two governments, this organization has largely
been incapable of dealing with Gaza’s needs (Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, 2015). This is
primarily due to the significant power given to Israel. The GRM granted Israel the power to
determine what materials can be imported and what projects the PA is allowed to be implement
in Gaza. Restricted materials include items such as “cement, gravel and metal bars”. This
restriction has resulted in Israel’s near prohibition of necessary reconstruction materials.
Essential reconstruction materials have been largely restricted from entering Gaza due to Israel’s
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labeling of them as “dual use” 21 items, which are capable of both military and civilian purposes
and therefore constitute as a threat to Israel’s national security (UNHRC, 2015, 152). While
some of the materials identified by Israel may pose a certain amount of risk to the state, the
international community has identified these materials as indispensable for reconstruction
efforts.22 In addition to restricting reconstruction materials, Israel has also limited a significant
portion of humanitarian assistance from accessing Gaza. As a result of this, humanitarian
agencies like the UN have been largely unable to provide assistance and facilitate the physical
reconstruction of Palestinian homes in Gaza (UNHRC, 2015). Human Rights Watch (2017)
specifically found that Israel’s restrictions have obstructed the reconstruction or rehabilitation of
roughly 17,800 housing units in 2016 alone.
The OSAPG and the legal precedent set by the ICTR, recognize that a lack of proper
housing creates “circumstances that could lead to a slow death,” (OSAPG, n.a., and Human
Rights Watch, 2015, 56). As such, the actions taken by the IDF during the 2014 Israel Gaza War
and those actions taken by the State of Israel proceeding the conflict should be understood as
having deliberately inflicting on Gaza resident’s conditions of life intended to bring about the
physical destruction of Palestinians in whole or in part (OSAPG, n.a., and Human Rights Watch,
2015, 56). While the state of Israel could argue that the destruction of Palestinian homes was a
natural consequence of war, the genocidal intent can be inferred from the IDF’s deliberate
targeting of residential homes and the active obstruction of reconstruction efforts by Israel. As
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Israel currently has two lists of “dual” civilian-military items (OCHAOPT, 2015). The list for Gaza includes items
such as “electronic and electric equipment, communications equipment, and industrial raw materials, are used to
rebuild and upgrade offensive tunnels leading to Israel; to manufacture weapons, particularly rockets; and to
create technological combat support units.” Israel has specifically alleged that these items and numerous others,
are often used to create weapons and “fortifying tunnels.” (Human Rights Watch, 2016).
22
It has been recognized that at the current, only 24 truckloads of necessary construction material are permitted
to enter Gaza, despite the fact that 606 truckloads a day is necessary to complete reconstruction within five years
(Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, 2015).
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identified in the last chapter, the IDF’s was found to have specifically targeted residential homes
despite evidence indicating the dangerous effect that these attacks had on individual’s and their
homes. While these attacks were primarily understood as having been committed with the intent
of killing or causing serious bodily harm to Gaza residents, the UNHRC (2015) highlights the
fact that the IDF had to have known the effect that such an attack would have on residential
homes. As such, these attacks should be understood as having also intended to destroy residential
homes and displace large numbers of Palestinians.
The intent can be inferred from the IDF’s choice of weapons and the purposeful targeting
of inhabited and uninhabited homes. Specifically, the IDF’s use of highly explosive artillery
weapons throughout the conflict were chosen with the knowledge and therefore the intent, that
these attacks would not only cause significant death and injury, but also substantial physical
damage to residential areas in Gaza. Similarly, the IDF’s intent is evident in the fact that the
UNHRC (2015) found evidence that the IDF targeted more than 200 residential buildings in
which civilians and Palestinian fighters were not present. While the IDF has claimed these
homes were being used for military purposes, the UNHRC (2015) has found relatively little
information confirming this fact. As there is no legal military objective to gain over destroying
an inhabited house, the IDF’s attacks should be recognized as having intended to impose
conditions of life that would bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians in whole or in
part.
In regards to Israel’s actions proceeding the conflict, its restrictions on necessary
construction materials and humanitarian assistance should be understood as intentionally
impeding construction efforts in order to maintain conditions of life in Gaza that would bring
about the physical destruction of Palestinians. While Israel has defended its restriction of dual
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use materials as necessary for its national security, Israel does not have to completely restrict
these materials and could protect its national security through more intensive monitoring and
tracking of ‘duel use’ materials. The choice to impose a blanket ban over ‘duel use’ maters also
signifies Israel’s intent to exert power over Gaza, rather than a need to protect its own national
security. This is clear in the fact that Israel has not only restricted the importation of
reconstruction materials, but has also restricted humanitarian assistance itself from entering into
the Gaza Strip. As humanitarian actors are neutral bodies and clearly do not possess as a threat to
the state’s national security, Israel’s overall restrictions clearly intend to maintain conditions of
life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians living in Gaza. Considering
the scale of the destruction to Gaza’s entire housing stock and the fact that these conditions have
lasted for nearly three years, Israel’s actions deliberately withhold proper housing from
Palestinians living in Gaza in order to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians in
whole or in part.
2. The Ongoing Electricity Crisis
The IDF has been accused of not only targeting residential homes, but also necessary
civilian infrastructure like Gaza’s power plant. Gaza’s sole power plant was struck by a round of
shelling launched by the IDF, on July 29, which caused an explosion that destroyed a whole
section of the power plant (UNHRC, 2015). As a result of this attack, the power plant was
ultimately forced to shut down entirely. As Gaza receives roughly 30 percent of its electricity
from this single power plant, and the rest is purchased from Israel and Egypt, the plant’s
destruction had a detrimental effect on Gaza residents. During the 2014 war, the complete
closure of the plant resulted in power outages which lasted up to 22 hours a day. These power
shortages had a devastating effect on Palestinians living in Gaza as they left individuals and
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families in the dark and largely without a means to refrigerate their food or air condition their
homes during the stifling summer heat. These power outages also had a broader effect on Gaza’s
population as a whole. According to the UNHRC (2015) as a result of the power plant’s closure
and the overall damage to Gaza’s electricity related infrastructure, Gaza’s power outages:
“forced hospitals to operate at limited capacity; led to a drastic reduction in the pumping
of water to households; and affected desalination plants and sewage treatment, which
significantly impacted on a wide range of human rights, in particular the rights to health,
water and sanitation.” (UNHRC, 2015, 154).
Despite the devastating effect that these power outages were having on Palestinians living
in Gaza, necessary repairs were unable to be made to the plant due to the conflict. While a
number of facilities were in possession of backup generators, such as hospitals and some water
treatment facilities, these generators were also under significant strain as a result and were often
inoperable due to a lack of available fuel throughout the conflict (OCHAOPT, 2014).
Sadly, even though the armed conflict ended, Gaza’s electricity crisis did not. Despite the
ceasefire and the development of the GRM, reconstruction materials needed to repair Gaza’s
power plant and rehabilitate its overall electricity infrastructure have scarcely been allowed to
enter the Gaza strip (Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, 2015). Specifically, Israel’s blockade has
largely restricted the importation of necessary materials such as, spare parts, electrical
equipment, and fuel needed to bring Gaza’s electricity infrastructure to an expectable level
(OCHA, 2015). As a result, reports found that relatively little reconstruction has occurred in the
last two and a half years. Specifically, as of January 2017 the damage sustained by Gaza's power
plant has yet to be fully repaired and as a result the plant is currently only capable of operating
“at half of its original capacity” (Najjar, 2017).
85

Due to this, Gaza has become almost completely dependent on Israel for power, which
has allowed Israel to inflate the prices of its electricity and fuel to nearly triple the cost of what
had previously been offered by Egypt 23(B’tselem, 2017). Subsequently, the PA and Palestinians
individuals living in Gaza are largely unable to afford electricity. As a result of both the near
destruction of Gaza’s electricity infrastructure, Israel’s severe restrictions of reconstruction
materials and the inflation of the price of electricity, residents continue to suffer from severe
electricity shortages. In June of 2015, nearly a year after the conflict ended, the OCHA (2015)
and the UNHRC (2015) found that over 20 percent of Gaza’s citizens did not have access to
electricity and those Palestinians who did, suffered from severe blackouts that lasted between 12
to 16 hours a day. While this was expected to get better with time, the situation has progressively
worsened since then. In January of 2017 protests broke out throughout all of the Gaza Strip in
response to increasingly longer and more frequent electricity blackouts. Specifically, the current
electricity crisis left Gaza residents without electricity for nearly 21 hours a day in January
(Najjar, 2017). While international donors have provided financial resources to assist with the
problem, this is only a temporary solution. What is needed to elevate the crisis is the complete
rehabilitation of Gaza’s power plant (OCHA, 2015).
Considering the severity of the blackouts and the detrimental effect this has had on Gaza
resident’s basic standard of living and their right to health, water and sanitation, Israel’s actions
during and proceeding the 2014 Israel-Gaza War should be recognized as having deliberately
inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians
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Gaza has always obtained a significant proportion of its electricity from Israel and Gaza, but the destruction of its
power plant made Gaza almost completely dependent on this electricity. While Egypt had previously sold
electricity of the Palestinian Authority, upon discovering illegal tunnels in Egypt the government complete stopped
trading. As a result, Gaza has had to rely solely on Israel for power.
(OCHAOPT, 2015).
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living Gaza, in whole or in part. The intent to bring about such life threatening conditions is clear
in the IDF’s direct targeting of Gaza’s power plant and the State of Israel’s intentional
impediment of rehabilitative efforts intended to restore electricity to Gaza residents. While the
UNHRC (2015) did not confirm whether the attack was intentional, the fact that the power plant
was struck on three previous occasions prior to the attack on July 29, indicates that the IDF did
in fact target the power plant. As UNHRC and international community previously recognized
Gaza’s power plant as a civilian object which is “indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population,” due to the IDF’s previous targeting of the plant in 2008, this direct attack was
arguably committed with the knowledge and therefore the intent of inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians living in Gaza.
Following the conflict, Israel’s restrictions on reconstruction materials, electrical supplies
and its intentional inflation of the price of electricity for Palestinians, intentionally hinder Gaza’s
ability to reconstruct its electrical infrastructure in an attempt to maintain conditions in Gaza
which will lead to a slow death. Israel defends its restrictions on construction materials as
necessary for its national security, but as the previous section highlighted, Israeli actors could
take a more active role in the reconstruction process or delegate this to a neutral party facilitator
like the UN in order to monitor and secure the legitimate use of identified ‘duel use’ materials in
Gaza. Instead Israel has chosen to impose detrimental restrictions not only on construction
materials, but also supplies and equipment necessary for the general upkeep of Gaza’s electrical
infrastructure. These restrictions in combination with Israel’s inflation of the price of electricity
should be understood as intending to preserve these conditions.
In 2015, the World Bank identified that Palestinians payed the highest tariffs related to
power, in the entire region of the Middle East (Hadid, 2015). While Gaza is able to buy its
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electricity, government controlled companies in Israel have raised the prices and attached such
high tariffs that this electricity is largely unaffordable. While this could be considered a business
policy, due to the state’s involvement and the blatantly detrimental effect this has had on Gaza
residents, the inflation of electricity and fuel process should be understood as purposefully
contributing to the electricity crisis. Ultimately, due to the recognized necessity of electricity for
the “survival of the civilian population,” in Gaza, the IDF’s attacks against the power plant and
Israel’s intentional obstruction of rehabilitative efforts should be recognized as deliberately
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians
living in Gaza, in whole or in part.
3. A Never Ending Water Emergency
By the end of the 2014 conflict, the OCHA recognized Gaza as having been on “the brink
of a public health crisis” 24(UNHRC, 2015,153). This near crisis was primarily due to Gaza’s
inability to conduct water and sanitation treatments, due to the partial destruction of Gaza’s
power plant and the wide scale damage sustained to vital water and sanitation facilities
throughout the territory. Gaza’s overall water and health (WASH) infrastructure also suffered
significant damage as a result of the conflict. Specifically, the UNHRC (2015) reported that 63
water facilities were damaged and an additional 23 were completely destroyed as a result of the
IDF’s aerial campaign and ground operations in Gaza. Of the sewage treatment facilities in the
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At the time of the conflict, an early warning system was put in place by the OCHA in order to monitor the rise of
13 communicable diseases. Due to the largescale displacement, overcrowding, severe damage to the public health
infrastructure the OCHA was extremely concerned about the spread of disease and possible outbreaks (WHO,
2015).
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territory, the UNHRC found that 60 percent of the sewage treatment plants and 27 percent of its
pumping stations were completely destroyed.
This destruction and the lack of necessary electricity almost fully prevented Gaza
facilities from conducting necessary water and sewage treatments throughout the conflict. As a
result, the lack of treatments further contaminated Gaza’s main aquifer and significantly
increased the risk of water borne illness such as diarrhea and meningitis (Supplement to
Readings on Water, 2016 and Health Cluster, 2014). The crisis was further compounded by the
destruction of various wells, pipelines, and reservoirs, which was reported to have resulted in
15,000 tons of solid waste having been leaked into Gaza streets and its aquifer which further
contaminating the already polluted water supplies (IMEU, 2015). As a result of Gaza’s inability
to conduct water treatments and the increasing contamination of the aquifer, the majority of the
water that was available to Gaza citizens was undrinkable.
Due to the power shortages caused by the closure of Gaza’s power plants, even untreated
water was largely unavailable to Gaza residents. As homes and residential business in Gaza
primarily rely on an electric powered pumping systems, Palestinians had essentially no way of
accessing water unless they possessed their own backup generator (UNHRC, 2015). Even then,
most residents were unable to obtain the necessary fuel needed to run these generators. As a
result, nearly 1.2 million Palestinians living in Gaza were unable to access running water
(Supplement to Readings on Water, 2016). Overall, the OCHA (2014) found that the majority of
Palestinians were unable to access even the minimal standard of thirty liters of water, which the
World Health Organization has identified as necessary to live off each day (OCHA, 2014).
Like that of the electricity crisis, Gaza’s water situation was precarious prior to the 2014
conflict and upon its end, the water situation did not get any better. The situation in Gaza has not
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gotten better, rather it has seemingly begun to deteriorate since the ceasefire. Specifically, the
damage caused during the 2014 conflict had a detrimental effect on Gaza’s aquifer, which was
over strained and considerably contaminated prior to the conflict (Europarl, 2016). As the
damage caused during the conflict remains relatively the same, the contamination of the aquifer
has increased significantly. Like that of the housing and electrical situation, delays in the
rehabilitation of Gaza’s water and sanitation facilities are primarily due to the restrictions
imposed by the GRM and Israel’s blockade. Specifically, Israel and the GRM severely limited
the importation of construction materials, restricted the movement of necessary public health
specialists or technicians from entering Gaza and most significantly delayed the implementation
of necessary health and sanitation projects (WASH) (EWASH, 2016).
As a result of this delay in reconstruction, the most recent statistics have found that only
10 percent of Gaza residents have access to safe drinking water, due to continuing problems
related to the quality and quantity of water available to them (Europarl, 2016). While some
Palestinian residents have access to municipal waters, ultimately due to contamination from the
aquifer and the overall water network throughout Gaza, this water is only usable for household
chores or bathing (Water Situation Alarming in Gaza, 2017). In order to obtain safe drinking
water residents in Gaza are either forced to walk miles each day in order to reach a desalination
station or have to rely on private and expensive external suppliers to provide them with ‘safe
drinking water’ (Al-Mughrabi, 2017). As these suppliers are largely private and uncontrolled, the
water provided is not only expensive but often contaminated as well and subsequently
contributes to lower health and hygiene throughout Gaza (Gaza one year on and Al-Mughrabi,
2017). The International Community has highlighted the need for a more permanent solution, as
the current situation in Gaza endangers the health and well-beings of Palestinians living in Gaza.
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Specifically, the World Bank (2017) has recognized that if programs aren’t put in place to deal
with the contamination and water scarcity in Gaza by 2020, “the damage will be irreversible”
(World Bank, 2017, 2).
Due to the severity of the destruction caused during the conflict, the impacts it has had on
Palestinians, and the continued deterioration of water quality in Gaza, the IDF’s actions during
the 2014 conflict and Israel’s continued blockade should be understood as deliberately inflicting
conditions of life calculated in Gaza to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians in
whole or in part. While this analysis did not find any evidence indicating the IDF’s purposeful
targeting of water or sanitation facilities, the IDF’s shelling of Gaza’s power plant and the
overall disproportionate use of force used during the conflict should be understood as having
intended to further deteriorate Gaza’s already dangerous water situation. This intent can be
inferred from the fact that these acts were committed despite the knowledge of the effect that
such an attack would have on Gaza’s infrastructure (UNHRC, 2015).
Israel’s seemingly deliberate impediment of the rehabilitation of Gaza’s water and
sanitation facilities indicates its intent to maintain conditions of life in Gaza that will lead to the
slow death of Palestinians. Israel’s intent to further exacerbate the water situation in Gaza is clear
in the fact that it has not only prohibited items it constitutes as dual use, but the state has
deliberately prevented the implementation of necessary water and sanitation (WASH) projects in
Gaza. This is apparent in the fact that “46 out of 53 WASH projects for Gaza are at stake” of
being further delayed or canceled by Israel (EWASH, 2016, 2). As there is no feasible security
threat associated with the implementation of WASH projects facilitated by the international
community, there is no reason to prevent the implementation of necessary projects except to
further aggravate the water situation and ensure that the damages incurred are permanent. As the
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OSAPG recognizes the deliberate deprivation of clean water from a group as conditions which
bring about a slow death and the scale of the current water emergency, the IDF’s actions and
Israel’s ongoing blockade should be recognized as intending to destroy all Palestinians living in
Gaza, in whole or in part.
4. Inaccessibility to Health Care
As emphasized within the previous sections and the last chapter, the actions taken by the
IDF had a devastating effect on the physical well-being of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.
Due to the sheer number of Palestinians physically effected by the conflict, Gaza’s medical
system was put under significant pressure in its attempt to provide medical assistance to the
thousands of Palestinians in need. Gaza’s already fragile health care system 25 was further
destabilized following a variety of attacks perpetrated by the IDF, which were seemingly
intended to restrict Gaza’s ability to provide lifesaving medical assistance to injured Palestinians.
These actions specifically regard what has been understood as the IDF’s purposeful targeting of
Gaza’s power plant, medical facilities, as well as ambulance and medical personnel.
As briefly mentioned, the partial destruction of Gaza’s power plant had severe
consequences on hospitals and medical facilities in the territory. Specifically, the attack seriously
limited the amount of electricity available to hospitals and other medical facilities, which further
limited their already narrow capacity to operate (UNHRC, 2015, 153). While hospitals and other
medical facilities were given priority during these power outages, the electricity provided was
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Prior to the conflict, Gaza’s medical system was already limited in its ability to provide necessary services to
Palestinians, which Amnesty International (2014) has largely attributed as having result from what was at the time
the seventh year of Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Specifically, hospitals in Gaza had already suffered from a lack of fuel,
power, water supplies and significant shortages of necessary drugs and medical supplies proceeding the conflict.
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still unreliable and couldn’t always power necessary medical equipment (Health Emergency
Highlights, 2014). This subsequently limited the number of services and treatments available to
patients harmed in the conflict. Even when electricity was available, due to its relatively limited
quantity and unreliable nature, surgeries and medical procedures became increasingly lifethreatening due to the risk of complications associated with violate surges or loss of electricity.
Despite the limited amount of electricity available to them, those medical facilities that remained
physically intact throughout the conflict continued to provide what services they could.
That being said, a number of hospitals and clinics were physically impacted by the
conflict and were subsequently completely unable to provide medical assistance to those in need
or further limited in their capabilities. As a result of both direct and indirect attacks perpetrated
by the IDF, the Gaza Strip Joint Health Assessment report (2014) found that “17 hospitals, 56
primary health care clinics and 45 ambulances were destroyed or damaged” as a result of the
conflict (Health Emergency Highlights, 2014). Despite international condemnation, the IDF has
defended its targeting of hospitals as legitimate military objectives, due to the alleged use of
hospitals to store military weapons and equipment (UNHRC, 2015). While the UNHRC (2015)
neither confirmed nor denied the presence of military weapons in hospitals, ultimately the
international community has recognized these attacks as disproportionately harming civilian
lives and infrastructure. Not only were patients at risk of direct harm as a result of these attacks,
the physical destruction of Gaza’s medical facilities indirectly harmed Palestinians in Gaza, as
these attacks further limited the quality of health procedures available to them throughout the
conflict. The IDF’s attacks often damaged the physical structure of the hospital or clinic and
destroyed or damaged necessary medical equipment, supplies, and even death of health
professionals.
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While the total number of health professionals killed in the IDF’s targeting of hospitals is
unknown, the UNHRC (2015) found that 23 medical personnel were killed in the field as a result
of IDF attacks against ambulances. These deaths have largely been regarded by the international
community as having resulted from the direct targeting of ambulances and medical personnel
attempting to provide assistance to injured Palestinians throughout the conflict. In addition to
killing 23 medical personal, these attacks either damaged or completely destroyed 43
ambulances. While the UNHRC (2015) and Amnesty International (2014) have not confirmed
whether the IDF intentionally targeted internationally protected ambulances and paramedics,
both reports identified specific instances in which ambulances were targeted by IDF artillery fire
and recognized medical personnel were directly shot at, despite a complete lack of evidence
indicating the presence of a legitimate military objective in the vicinity26. Ultimately, these
attacks not only resulted in the immediate death of patients and medical personnel, but also
limited the number of medical transportation systems and medics available to individuals injured
as during the conflict.
Like that of the housing, electricity, and water situations following the conflict, these
problems have continued beyond the conflict. The UNHRC (2015) report found that nearly a
year after the conflict, necessary reconstruction of seven hospitals and an additional 12 clinics
were significantly delayed due to the GRM’s restriction of construction materials needed. In
addition to preventing the physical rehabilitation of a significant number of hospitals, the GRM’s
and Israel’s restrictions also severely limit the importation of medical equipment and medical

26

The UNHRC (2015) report specifically identified that most instances in which clearly ambulances fell under direct
military fire occurred in situations in which there was no evident threat or military activity in the vicinity. In some
of these attacks, a new ambulance was sent to respond and rescue civilians and injured colleagues and were
subsequently fired upon by the IDF a second time.
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supplies that were destroyed or depleted as a result of the conflict. Specifically, as of May 2016
Palestine’s Minister of Health identified 570 necessary medicines and 39 medical supplies that
medical facilities have constituently been unable to keep stock of due to the blockade (WHO,
2016).
While the ongoing electricity crisis was previously address, it is necessary to briefly
highlight the impact that this lack of electricity continues to have on medical facilities in Gaza.
Due to the prevailing daily power blackouts, hospitals and clinics in Gaza have been forced to
rely on backup generators in order to power their facilities (WHO, 2016). While these generators
provide more power than that of the electricity offered to them, these generators are also
unreliable due to a lack of fuel throughout Gaza and the overall strain put upon these machines
daily. As a result, hospitals are frequently subject to either power outages or electrical surges
which have dire consequences on the patients receiving medical services that require electricity27
(UNHRC, 2015). As a result of the limited electrical capacities of hospitals and clinics in Gaza,
specialized treatments and surgeries are almost completely unavailable and as a result Palestinian
individuals have had to rely on medical services outside of Gaza.
Due to the ongoing Gaza blockade, in order to receive external medical care, individuals
must receive direct approval from Israel in order to obtain the necessary referral or travel permits
needed to leave Gaza (WHO, 2016). As a result, a comprehensive referral system has developed
between Israel and the PA in order to obtain these health permits. While this system is facilitated
by numerous international organizations such as the World Bank, World Health Organization
and the European Union, ultimately Israeli authorities have the final say in who is or is not issued
medical related permits. As a result of this, a majority of Gaza referral applications are either

27

This is most apparent in Gaza’s ICU unit, in which premature babies require constituent electricity in order to
power necessary incubators (IMEMC news, 2016).
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denied or significantly delayed in their attempts to seek medical treatment (WHO, 2016). As of
December 2016 the WHO (2016), found that 58.3 percent of the 2,596 applicants who applied to
leave Gaza through the Erez checkpoint were denied or severely delayed28. As the majority of
those Palestinian referral applicants have applied in an attempt to seek specialized medical
services, such as oncology, orthopedics, cardiology and neurosurgery, the complete denial or
even the delay of such permits can have a deadly impact on those individual’s health conditions.
As the OSAPG and the legal precedent set within the ICTR have explicitly recognized
the deprivation of medical services from a group as an act of genocide that will lead to a slow or
indirect death, the IDF’s attacks during the 2014 conflict and Israel’s continuing Gaza blockade
should be recognized as deliberately inflicting upon Palestinians conditions of life calculated to
bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part (OSAPG, n.a and Human Rights Watch,
2015). While the IDF has argued that it only targeted legitimate military objectives, this analysis
recognizes the attacks against Gaza’s power plant, medical facilities, ambulances and medical
personnel as having been deliberately targeted in an attempt to prevent Palestinians from
receiving adequate medical assistance. The intent of these attacks can be inferred from the lack
of alleged military objectives in a significant number of these attacks and the choice of
destructive and indiscriminate weapons, despite the IDF’s possession of more accurate and less
destructive precise targeting weapons systems (UNHRC, 2015).
Additionally, Israel’s severe restrictions of necessary importations and the movement of
Palestinians should be understood as intentionally impeding the rehabilitation of Gaza’s health
system and therefore having intended to maintain conditions of life that lead to a slow death.

28

Specifically, 91 requests for permits were official denied, while another 1,422 were completely ignored and
received no response (WHO Monthly Report, 2016). Of those who were denied and ignored 111 were elderly
individuals over the age of 60 and 323 were children and often regarded appointments for numerous specialized
medical services.
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This intent is most apparent in the restrictions of necessary medical equipment and supplies. As
the importation of essential medicines and incubators arguably do not pose as a threat to Israel’s
national security, Israel’s withholding of such supplies must intend to maintain conditions of life
which will lead to the slow death of Palestinians living in Gaza. While Israel could make the
counter argument that it permits Gaza citizens to travel through its borders in order to obtain
medical assistance, ultimately this referral system is genocidal as over half of Palestinian
applicants are either denied or receive no response. As a significant number of those who apply
for specialized care do so in order to receive treatment for life threatening illnesses such as
cancer or brain tumors, Israel’s denial or lack of response to applications indirectly leads to the
immediate or slow death of Palestinians (WHO, 2016). Due to the scale and the systematic
nature of these actions, the IDF’s actions during the 2014 conflict and Israel’s restrictions since
then should be recognized as deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about
the physical destruction of Palestinians living in Gaza, in whole or in part.
In conclusion, this analysis found that the actions taken by the IDF’s and the State of
Israel during and following the 2014 Israel-Gaza War violated article 2 (c) of the UNGC, which
prohibits acts that deliberately inflict conditions of life intended to bring about the groups
physical destruction in whole or in part. The IDF’s direct targeting of essential civilian
infrastructure, such as residential homes, Gaza’s power plant, and various medical facilities, and
its overall use of force throughout the conflict constitute as deliberate attacks intended to create
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians living in
Gaza. Similarly, Israel’s restrictions on the movement of goods and people from entering or
exiting the Gaza Strip actively maintain these deadly conditions. Ultimately, the actions taken by
the IDF and the State of Israel were recognized as acts of genocide because they deliberately
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restrict Palestinians in Gaza from accessing necessary rights, such as that of housing, electricity,
clean water, and health services, that are permitted to Israeli citizens. As such, these actions are
clearly directed against residents in Gaza on the solely basis of their identity as Arab
Palestinians. The next chapter will conclude this study with a short analysis regarding the overall
findings. Specifically, it will identify why the actions taken by the IDF, Hamas, and affiliated
Palestinian armed groups constitute as acts of genocide, how this relates to the power dynamic
between Israel and Palestine, and what this means for future investigations and the conflict.
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Chapter 7—Conclusion
The last chapter examined the actions taken by the IDF and the state of Israel as possible
violations of article 2 (c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention (UNGC). This analysis specifically
found that the actions taken by the IDF throughout the conflict and Israel’s restrictive blockade
legally constitute as having deliberately inflicted upon Gaza conditions of life calculated to bring
about the physical destruction of Palestinians in whole or in part (UNGC, 1948). This last
chapter will conclude by explaining why the actions taken by the IDF, Hamas, and affiliated
Palestinian armed groups constitute as acts of genocide, how this relates to the power dynamic
between Israel and Palestine, and what this means for future investigations.
Upon examining the 2014 Israel-Gaza War in its entirety, it was apparent that a variety of
international laws were violated by the IDF, Hamas and various other Palestinian armed groups.
Specifically, this analysis identified countless instances in which actors on both sides of the
conflict incited violence, utilized prohibited weapons, and directly targeted recognized civilians
and civilian populated areas in their attacks. As a result, the seven week long conflict killed
2,324 and injured another 12,831 Palestinians and Israelis (UNHRC, 2015). While the
international community has exclusively referred to the actions taken by various Israeli and
Palestinian actors as feasibly amounting to ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity,’ this
analysis determined that these attacks constitute as acts of genocide under international law.
Although the acts taken by Israeli and Palestinian actors may also constitute as ‘war crimes’ and
‘crimes against humanity’, ultimately their actions were acts of genocide because they were
committed with the intent of killing or harming large numbers of individuals due to their
membership in their respective religious-national groups.
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This intent to destroy large numbers of individuals on the basis of their religiousnationalist identity as either an ‘Arab-Palestinian’ or ‘Israeli-Jew’ is apparent in the statements
and choices made by various Israeli and Palestinian political and military officials. In regards to
Hamas and affiliated Palestinian armed groups, numerous statements were made by military
officials which declared their intent to not only target protected civilians, but to kill and harm
those individuals due to their religious-nationalist identity as ‘Israeli-Jews’. The intent to not
only kill or harm individuals, but destroy Israeli-Jews is explicitly clear in the Hamas Charter. As
such, all attacks made by or affiliated with Hamas throughout the conflict intended to bring about
the physical destruction of Israeli-Jews in whole or in part. Similarly, various statements made
by political, military, and religious officials in Israel openly called for violence, revenge and the
death of individuals in Gaza solely on the basis of their religious-nationalist identity as ArabPalestinians. While the intent to destroy Arab-Palestinians was not explicitly called for within
their constitution or any publicly available policies, as set by the legal precedent within the ICTR
this genocidal intent was inferred from various statements made by Israeli officials and from the
IDF’s direct targeting of civilians, purposeful choice to use indiscriminate weapons and overall
disproportionate use of force.
Therefore, the targeted killing of Israeli and Palestinian individuals due to their
membership in a specific religious-nationalist is what distinguishes the actions taken by the IDF,
Hamas and affiliated Palestinian armed groups as acts of genocide rather than crimes against
humanity or war crimes. This distinction is important, because all three crimes are similar in the
fact that they prohibit military actions that purposefully kill or are knowingly committed despite
the risk they pose to noncombatants, crimes against humanity and war crimes specifically
prohibit systematic attacks against “civilian populations,” whereas genocide prohibits the
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targeted destruction “of individuals that collectively form part of a single group,” (The Rome
Statute, 2001 and Sands, 2013). Referring to the actions taken by the IDF, Hamas and affiliated
Palestinian armed groups exclusively as war crimes or crimes against humanity completely
disregards the shared experiences and loss suffered by Israeli and Palestinians as a religiousnationalist group.
While the actions taken by the IDF, Hamas and affiliated Palestinian armed groups were
intended to bring about the physical destruction of their respective ‘other group’ and therefore
constitute as acts of genocide, ultimately this analysis recognizes the IDF and the State of Israel
as exclusively possessing the capabilities necessary to actually execute a genocide. That is not to
discount Hamas and affiliated Palestinian armed groups as genocidal actors. The intent to destroy
Israelis in whole or in part is apparent and as such Hamas’ attacks must be recognized as
individual acts of genocide and therefore attempted genocide under international law. As of now,
this analysis has found that Hamas and affiliated Palestinian armed groups are incapable of
bringing about the physical destruction of Israelis in whole or in part, due to the current power
dynamic inherent in the relationship between Israel and Palestine.
As the occupying and settler-colonial state, Israel has successfully implemented the Gaza
blockade which has virtually able to control over what enters and exists the Gaza Strip. Due to
this control over Gaza’s borders, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups are largely unable to
access advanced weapons and therefore lack the military capabilities necessary to bring about
physical destruction of Israelis, in whole or in part. Even though Hamas and other Palestinian
armed groups have been able to obtain materials needed to build and target a significant number
of rockets and mortars against Israeli citizens, when up against Israel’s Iron dome missile
detection system these weapons are relatively incapable of killing a ‘substantial portion’ of
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Israel’s population. This is apparent in the fact that out of the “4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars”
launched against Israel, only six Israeli civilians and 67 Israeli soldiers were killed throughout
the conflict (OCHA, 2015). While these attacks are capable of injuring Israelis, as identified by
the 1,600 Israelis who were injured during the 2014 hostilities, due to the limited information
regarding the severity of their injuries it is as of now unclear whether these injuries constitute as
genocide under international law (UNHRC, 2015).
What is clear, is the fact that Israel’s near complete control over the Gaza Strip and
access to more advanced weapons has allowed the state to unabatedly kill, injury, and inflict
conditions of life on Palestinians in Gaza intended to about the destruction of Arab-Palestinians,
in whole or in part. This is apparent in the disproportionate number of Palestinians killed and
injured throughout the conflict, which killed 2,251 and injured another 11,231 Palestinians.
While there is relatively limited information on the severity of these injures, the UNHRC (2015)
found that ten percent of the injuries suffered during the conflict were permanent and therefore
constitute as ‘serious bodily harm’ under international law. Considering this, Israel directly killed
and seriously injured approximately 3,374 Palestinians living in Gaza. This number doesn’t
include those Palestinians Israel has indirectly killed in the last two and a half years due to a lack
of housing, electricity, water and medical aid available to Palestinians living in Gaza. This ability
to obstruct necessary reconstruction and therefore maintain conditions of life which cause a slow
death, is what make’s Israel more capable and guilty of perpetrating a genocide against ArabPalestinians living in Gaza.
Although the IDF and the State of Israel did not utilize the same genocidal tactics as
those used in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the actions taken in Gaza during the 2014 Israel-Gaza War
constitute as genocide because they were intended to and have succeeded in destroying Arab-
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Palestinians in whole or in part. The attempt by the international community to create a ‘model’
genocide in which all genocides are compared too, only serves to limit the applicability and
understanding of the crime of genocide. Every genocide develops differently. Some manifest
near instantaneously and result in the gruesome slaughter and systematic rape of individuals, like
that of Rwanda or the Yugoslavia genocide. Others, happen gradually and covertly kill, injure,
and repress thousands of people solely based upon their religious national identity, like that of
the Palestinians living in Gaza. While the recent 2014 conflict resulted in the death and serious
bodily harm of more than 3,374, this is only one snapshot of a seemingly never ending conflict,
which has directly killed over 9,000 Arab-Palestinians in the last seventeen years (B'Tselem,
2014 and the UNHRC, 2015). This covert genocide must end and must be prosecuted under
international law.
While the ICC and the international community have a legal and moral obligation to
recognize and prosecute Israeli and Palestinian actors for their respective parts in perpetrating or
attempting to commit genocide during the 2014 Israel-Gaza War, this will likely never happen.
Global politics which dictate the rulings of the ICC and the actions taken by the UN, will never
permit such a trial or prosecution to occur. The international community will therefore continue
to utilize labels such as ‘war crimes,’ ‘crimes against humanity,’ or even ‘atrocity crimes’ to
refer to the genocidal acts continuously committed by Israeli and Palestinian actors (UNHRC,
2015 and OSAPG, 2014). In this instance, the labeling of Israeli and Palestinian crimes as ‘war
crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ only serves as euphemism which blatantly ignores the
acts for what they truly are.
Even though the crimes committed by Israeli and Palestinian actors during the 2014
Israel-Gaza War will never receive legal recognition under international law, the conflict is still
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that of a genocide. Regardless of whether the ICC or the UN recognizes it as such, the systematic
killing and harming of Israeli-Jews and Arab-Palestinian individuals on the basis of their
religious national identity continues today and will continue as long as the conflict prevails.
While international institutions, like the ICC and the UN, are nearly bound by global politics to
ignore the genocidal nature of this conflict, international scholars and non-governmental
organizations have an obligation to overcome this pressure to ignore the conflict as that of a
genocide. Specifically, referring to human rights organizations such as Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch, which despite their promise of ‘impartiality’ continue to adhere to
global politics and refuse to even analyze the conflict as a possible genocide. As these
organizations were created with the intent of being free of political biases and influence,
organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have a duty to recognize and
publicize what the international community itself cannot. The continuous ignorance and denial of
the Israeli and Palestinian genocide cannot endure, otherwise both religious-nationalist group
will continue to commit acts of genocide against one another until either group ceases to exist.
As the genocidal conflict has already taken over 10,600 Palestinian and Israeli lives in the past
seventeen years alone, the question remains. How many more Palestinians and Israelis have to
die before this crime is recognized?
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